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The Dark Side of Industry Tournament Incentives
51/51 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
The 51 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679x.2009.00361.x
Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.019
The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04735.x
Do Short‐Term Objectives Lead to Under‐ or Overinvestment in Long‐Term Projects?
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01503.x
Making Sense of Cents: An Examination of Firms That Marginally Miss or Beat Analyst Forecasts
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00012-4
What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00130
Are Some Mutual Fund Managers Better Than Others? Cross‐Sectional Patterns in Behavior and Performance
resolves10.2308/acch.2000.14.2.235
Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators
resolves10.2308/accr.2006.81.1.83
The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.009
Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679x.2006.00194.x
Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud?
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.09.001
Impact of firm performance expectations on CEO turnover and replacement decisions
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.005
Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.02.001
Effects of managerial labor market on executive compensation: Evidence from job-hopping
resolves10.1086/261826
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.011
Internal corporate governance, CEO turnover, and earnings management
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhy101
Analyst Career Concerns, Effort Allocation, and Firms’ Information Environment
resolves10.2308/acch.1999.13.4.365
A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.02.007
CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most influence on earnings management?
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01470.x
Rank‐Order Tournaments and Incentive Alignment: The Effect on Firm Performance
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2435292
The Contract Year Phenomenon in the Corner Office: An Analysis of Firm Behavior During CEO Contract Renewals
resolves10.2308/accr.2001.76.3.313
The Effect of Missing a Quarterly Earnings Benchmark on the CEO's Annual Bonus
resolves10.1086/262055
Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning
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