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Corporate Payout Policy in Founder and Family Firms

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2416874
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1 of 38 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-28

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

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References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.5465/30040613
The 37 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00298
A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clienteles
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00567
Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500
resolves10.2307/4131472
Board Composition: Balancing Family Influence in S&P 500 Firms
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhn099
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
resolves10.1016/j.jbusvent.2010.09.003
R&D investments in family and founder firms: An agency perspective
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.07.004
Payout policy in the 21st century
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01261.x
Executive Financial Incentives and Payout Policy: Firm Responses to the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut
resolves10.1093/qje/120.3.791
Dividend Taxes and Corporate Behavior: Evidence from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.07.005
Dividend policy and the earned/contributed capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory☆
resolves10.1086/NTJ41789388
A Test of the Theory of Tax Clienteles for Dividend Policies
resolves10.1111/j.1741-6248.1994.00109.x
Potential Contributions of Organizational Behavior to the Study of Family-Owned Businesses
resolves10.1016/j.jbusvent.2006.06.004
Destructive and productive family relationships: A stewardship theory perspective
resolves10.1257/aer.91.1.54
Dividends and Expropriation
resolves10.1017/s0022109009090139
Founder-CEOs, Investment Decisions, and Stock Market Performance
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00038-1
Disappearing dividends: changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay?
resolves10.1111/j.0306-686x.2003.05624.x
Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and the Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis
resolves10.1080/13518470802588718
The relation between dividends and insider ownership in different legal systems: international evidence
resolves10.1162/00335530360535162
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00873.x
Do Dividend Clienteles Exist? Evidence on Dividend Preferences of Retail Investors
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00765.x
Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00474
Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution Hypothesis
resolves10.1111/j.1741-6248.1994.00331.x
Family Business and Multiple Levels of Conflict
resolves10.1017/s0022109000002805
Insiders' Tax Preferences and Firms' Choices between Dividends and Share Repurchases
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00061-1
Financial flexibility and the choice between dividends and stock repurchases
resolves10.1080/13571519984304
Owner as Manager, Extended Horizons and the Family Firm
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
resolves10.1108/14757700910934256
Why are firms with entrenched managers more likely to pay dividends?
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6520.2004.00040.x
Feuding Families: When Conflict Does a Family Firm Good
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00199
Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World
resolves10.22495/cocv9i2c2art2
Corporate cash holdings and their implications on firm value in family and founder firms
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhr072
Determinants of Dividend Smoothing: Empirical Evidence
resolves10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.03.004
Are family firms really superior performers?
resolves10.1086/294442
Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares
resolves10.1111/j.1475-6803.1982.tb00299.x
GROWTH, BETA AND AGENCY COSTS AS DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIOS
resolves10.1016/0047-2727(92)90069-r
A direct examination of the dividend clientele hypothesis
resolves10.1111/j.1475-6803.1994.tb00198.x
USING DIVIDEND POLICY AND MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP TO REDUCE AGENCY COSTS
The 3 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedTwo agency-cost explanations of dividends
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedDistribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained earnings, and taxes
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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