Reference health
Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness
50/50 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
11 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 50 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1007/s11151-006-9110-z
Delegation of Contracting in the Private Provision of Public Services
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1825983
Risk Allocation and Incentives for Private Contractors: An Analysis of Italian Project Financing Contracts
resolves10.2307/2555956
The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement
resolves10.1257/jel.47.3.729
Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead
resolves10.1111/1468-0297.00119
Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public‐Private Partnerships
resolves10.5089/9781589064935.058
Public-Private Partnerships, Government Guarantees, and Fiscal Risk
resolves10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00181.x
Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public‐‐private partnerships
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6451.2006.00283.x
INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT*
resolves10.1111/1467-937X.00114
The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.10.004
To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public–private partnerships
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00056.x
Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities
resolves10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.08.002
Infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns: The roots of public discontent
resolves10.3406/rei.2000.1048
Econometrics of Contracts : an Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contracting
resolves10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036907
Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations
The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedDelegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate
no DOI — not checkedCorruption and Competition in Procurement Auctions
no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedRisk of Corruption and Collusion in the Awarding of Concession Contracts
no DOI — not checkedCorruption and Concession Renegotiations. Evidence From the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin America
no DOI — not checkedMore is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts
no DOI — not checkedref31
no DOI — not checkedOn the Theory of Delegation
no DOI — not checkedService Procurement in Public Sector: The Influence of the Institutional Context on the Decision Makers' Attentiveness to Transaction Cost Considerations
no DOI — not checkedref45
no DOI — not checkedTwo implications follows. First, when evaluated at ?(?) = ? mh the derivative of L * (?(?), ?(?), ? ? ) with respect to ?(?) is RECENT PUBLICATIONS BY CEIS Tor Vergata
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