Reference health

Saving More to Borrow Less: Experimental Evidence from Access to Formal Savings Accounts in Chile

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2451036
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54/54 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

20 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 54 checked references that resolve
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Saving and economic shocks in rural Pakistan
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Win Some Lose Some? Evidence from a Randomized Microcredit Program Placement Experiment by Compartamos Banco
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Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence From a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines
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Prompting Microfinance Borrowers to Save: A Field Experiment from Guatemala
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Pretending to Be Poor: Borrowing to Escape Forced Solidarity in Cameroon
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The Economic Lives of the Poor
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Do Rural Banks Matter? Evidence from the Indian Social Banking Experiment
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The Impact of Insurance Provision on Household Production and Financial Decisions
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Housing, Health, and Happiness
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Happiness on Tap: Piped Water Adoption in Urban Morocco
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Kin Groups and Reciprocity: A Model of Credit Transactions in Ghana
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Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage Entrepreneurship Among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India
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Micro-Savings & Informal Insurance in Villages: How Financial Deepening Affects Safety Nets of the Poor - A Natural Field Experiment
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Agricultural Decisions after Relaxing Credit and Risk Constraints
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Moving to Opportunity and Tranquility: Neighborhood Effects on Adult Economic Self-Sufficiency and Health from a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment
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Training, Wages, and Sample Selection: Estimating Sharp Bounds on Treatment Effects
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The 20 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedHousehold Saving: Micro Theories and Micro Facts
no DOI — not checkedInformal Insurance, Social Networks, and Savings Access: Evidence from a Framed Field Experiment
no DOI — not checkedHow Does Risk Management Influence Production Decisions? Evidence from a Field Experiment
no DOI — not checkedref20
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no DOI — not checkedSaving and liquidity constraints
no DOI — not checkedLenders Blind Trust and Borrowers Blind Spots: A Descriptive Investigation of Personal Loans
no DOI — not checkedChallenges in Banking the Rural Poor: Evidence from Kenya's Western Province
no DOI — not checkedFDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households
no DOI — not checkedInsurance, Credit, and Technology Adoption: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi
no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedWorking Paper Graduate School of Business
no DOI — not checkedPoverty, Social Stress & Mental Health
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no DOI — not checkedRisk and Saving in Northern Nigeria
no DOI — not checkedEfficiency and the Role of Default when Security Markets are Incomplete
no DOI — not checkedref71
no DOI — not checkedColumns (4)-(6) contain the sample of participants who indicated that they 'always' or 'frequently' regretted not having saved more. Robust standard errors, clustered at the group level
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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