Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known
work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction,
withdrawal, or removal notice.
The 54 checked references that resolve
resolves10.3386/w19119Win Some Lose Some? Evidence from a Randomized Microcredit Program Placement Experiment by Compartamos Banco
resolves10.1086/671713Prompting Microfinance Borrowers to Save: A Field Experiment from Guatemala
resolves10.1086/661220Pretending to Be Poor: Borrowing to Escape Forced Solidarity in Cameroon
resolves10.3386/w15396Microinsurance, Trust and Economic Development: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Field Experiment
resolves10.1257/pol.20130371The Impact of Insurance Provision on Household Production and Financial Decisions
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2250748Intervention-Driven Changes in Social Networks and Their Effects on Household Outcomes
resolves10.1257/aer.103.6.2196Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage Entrepreneurship Among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1969504Micro-Savings & Informal Insurance in Villages: How Financial Deepening Affects Safety Nets of the Poor - A Natural Field Experiment
resolves10.1093/poq/nfp031Effects of Questionnaire Length on Participation and Indicators of Response Quality in a Web Survey
resolves10.1086/268687Effects of Questionnaire Length on Response Quality
resolves10.1257/aer.104.1.183Risk Sharing and Transactions Costs: Evidence from Kenya's Mobile Money Revolution
resolves10.2307/2971716Risk, Financial Markets, and Human Capital in a Developing Country
resolves10.1596/1813-9450-6085Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental Evidence from Village Economies
resolves10.3386/w18463Agricultural Decisions after Relaxing Credit and Risk Constraints
resolves10.3386/w18417Under-Savers Anonymous: Evidence on Self-Help Groups and Peer Pressure as a Savings Commitment Device
resolves10.2139/ssrn.588942Moving to Opportunity and Tranquility: Neighborhood Effects on Adult Economic Self-Sufficiency and Health from a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment
resolves10.3386/w11721Training, Wages, and Sample Selection: Estimating Sharp Bounds on Treatment Effects
resolves10.1111/1467-937x.00204Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
resolves10.3386/w17072Financially Fragile Households: Evidence and Implications
resolves10.3386/w14850Why is Mobility in India so Low? Social Insurance, Inequality, and Growth
resolves10.1086/261874Credit Market Constraints, Consumption Smoothing, and the Accumulation of Durable Production Assets in Low-Income Countries: Investments in Bullocks in India
resolves10.1086/380085Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving
resolves10.3368/jhr.xli.1.106The Impact of Banking and Fringe Banking Regulation on the Number of Unbanked Americans
The 20 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref10
no DOI — not checkedHousehold Saving: Micro Theories and Micro Facts
no DOI — not checkedInformal Insurance, Social Networks, and Savings Access: Evidence from a Framed Field Experiment
no DOI — not checkedHow Does Risk Management Influence Production Decisions? Evidence from a Field Experiment
no DOI — not checkedref20
no DOI — not checkedref22
no DOI — not checkedSaving and liquidity constraints
no DOI — not checkedLenders Blind Trust and Borrowers Blind Spots: A Descriptive Investigation of Personal Loans
no DOI — not checkedChallenges in Banking the Rural Poor: Evidence from Kenya's Western Province
no DOI — not checkedFDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households
no DOI — not checkedInsurance, Credit, and Technology Adoption: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi
no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedWorking Paper Graduate School of Business
no DOI — not checkedPoverty, Social Stress & Mental Health
no DOI — not checkedref59
no DOI — not checkedref61
no DOI — not checkedRisk and Saving in Northern Nigeria
no DOI — not checkedEfficiency and the Role of Default when Security Markets are Incomplete
no DOI — not checkedref71
no DOI — not checkedColumns (4)-(6) contain the sample of participants who indicated that they 'always' or 'frequently' regretted not having saved more. Robust standard errors, clustered at the group level
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