Reference health

Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2457092
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1 of 54 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-27

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

8 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2312726
The 53 checked references that resolve
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resolves10.2307/1913320
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resolves10.1257/aer.20130929
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resolves10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007
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resolves10.3390/a7010001
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resolves10.1145/3219166.3219171
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resolves10.1016/0166-218x(85)90074-5
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resolves10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.007
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resolves10.1257/mic.4.1.176
Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.004
Vacancies in supply chain networks
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.009
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resolves10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.002
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resolves10.1086/673402
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resolves10.2139/ssrn.3180740
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resolves10.1257/0002828054825466
Matching with Contracts
resolves10.1145/3033274.3085113
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resolves10.2307/1913392
Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
resolves10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.007
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resolves10.1109/tsg.2017.2786668
Bilateral Contract Networks for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading
resolves10.1257/aer.98.3.897
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resolves10.3982/ecta7143
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resolves10.2139/ssrn.2475468
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resolves10.2139/ssrn.2997223
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resolves10.2307/1911460
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resolves10.1287/moor.10.3.379
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resolves10.2307/1913160
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resolves10.1016/0899-8256(89)90018-3
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resolves10.1017/CCOL052139015X
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resolves10.1006/jeth.1996.0077
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resolves10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00048-1
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Market structure and matching with contracts
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedSince every {z i , z i+1 } an (A, b(z i ))-acceptable set by itself, as choice functions are simple, intensity function w must strictly decrease along circuit Q, which is impossible. Case 2: Suppose that for every z ? Z, {z} ? Z is A-acceptable. Suppose that {z 1 } is (A, s(z 1 ))-acceptable. From Lemma B.8 we can find a trail {z 2 , z 3 . . . z k } ? Z such that for every z i , either {z i , z i+1 } is a (A, b(z i ))-essential pair, (therefore w(z i ) > w(z i+1 )) or there are some y 1 . . . y l such that b(y j ) = s(z i ) for all 1 ? j ? l and {z i , y 1 . . . y l } is (A, b(z i ))-acceptable. trail terminates at the first occasion when {z i } is (A, b(z i ))-acceptable. Since the intensity strictly decreases, we cannot get back to a contract used earlier in the trail, so the trail must terminate
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedref10
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no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedref30
no DOI — not checkedThe economics of modern manufacturing: Technology, strategy, and organization
no DOI — not checkedA natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom
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