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Behavioral Spillovers from Targeted Incentives: Losses from Excluded Individuals Can Counter Gains from Those Selected

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2467579
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1 of 38 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-03

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

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References needing attention

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The 37 checked references that resolve
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The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedMoving Ahead with REDD: Issues, Options and Implications
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no DOI — not checkedThe Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out
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no DOI — not checkedA Social Exchange Approach to Voluntary Cooperation
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