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A Strategic Dynamic Programming Method for Studying Short Memory Equilibria of Stochastic Games with Uncountable Number of States

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2491795
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37/37 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-13

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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