Reference health
Controlling Product Risks When Consumers are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability vs. Minimum Quality Standard Regulation
1 of 60 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-24
At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.
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References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.1257/002205103765762725
The 59 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2290938
Environmental Regulation and Civil Liability under Causal Uncertainty: An Empirical Study of the French Legal System
resolves10.1007/s10018-013-0073-7
Liability as a complement to environmental regulation: an empirical study of the French legal system
resolves10.1016/j.irle.2008.02.008
The joint use of regulation and strict liability with multidimensional care and uncertain conviction
resolves10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.00239.x
Modelling the choice between regulation and liability in terms of social welfare
resolves10.1016/j.irle.2010.11.001
The impact of court errors on liability sharing and safety regulation for environmental/industrial accidents
resolves10.1016/j.joep.2014.05.003
Reducing within-group overconfidence through group identity and between-group confidence judgments
resolves10.1016/s0144-8188(99)00006-x
Combining regulation and legal liability for the control of external costs
resolves10.1016/j.jeem.2005.09.002
The choice of a liability regime when there is a regulatory gatekeeper
resolves10.1007/s11149-011-9165-0
Minimum quality standard regulation under imperfect quality observability
resolves10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00703.x
EX ANTE INVESTMENT, EX POST REMEDIES, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY*
resolves10.1093/jleo/ewt019
Should Consumers be Permitted to Waive Products Liability? Product Safety, Private Contracts, and Adverse Selection
resolves10.1016/S0927-0507(05)80057-X
Chapter 13 Financial decision-making in markets and firms: A behavioral perspective
resolves10.1007/s10657-013-9416-x
How do GM/non GM coexistence regulations affect markets and welfare?
resolves10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.505
Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
resolves10.1093/aler/ahh013
Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties
resolves10.2202/1932-9148.1050
The Tradeoffs between Regulation and Litigation: Evidence from Insurance Class Actions
resolves10.1002/bdm.678
Do positive illusions predict overconfidence in judgment? A test using interval production and probability evaluation measures of miscalibration
resolves10.3917/redp.186.0941
The Regulator and the Judge : The Optimal Mix in The Control of Environmental Risk
resolves10.1016/j.socec.2014.05.005
Self-attribution bias in consumer financial decision-making: How investment returns affect individuals’ belief in skill
resolves10.1016/j.irle.2004.03.003
Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regulation
resolves10.1016/0144-8188(88)90018-x
Products liability and scale effects in a long-run competitive equilibrium
resolves10.1515/rle-2013-0004
Liability versus Regulation for Dangerous Products When Consumers Vary in Their Susceptibility to Harm and May Misperceive Risk
resolves10.2307/1885326
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
resolves10.1016/j.irle.2008.02.002
Safety regulation vs. liability with heterogeneous probabilities of suit
resolves10.3386/w18418
A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence Rule over Regulation
resolves10.1086/467730
A Comparison of Taxes, Regulation, and Liability Rules under Imperfect Information
resolves10.1086/467567
Prior Regulation versus Post Liability: The Choice between Input and Output Monitoring
resolves10.2139/ssrn.396141
Law Enforcement Under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation
The 9 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedConsumer Optimism and Price Discrimination
no DOI — not checkedCoase vs. the Coasians: The Regulation and Development of Securities Markets in the Czech Republic and Poland
no DOI — not checkedEx Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?
no DOI — not checkedRegulation and the Law of Torts
no DOI — not checkedPsychology and Economics
no DOI — not checkedref49
no DOI — not checkedCompetition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations
no DOI — not checkedref65
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