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Correlation and Unmediated Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
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The 41 checked references that resolve
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Secure multiparty protocols and zero-knowledge proof systems tolerating a faulty minority
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Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
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Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by “Cheap” Pre-play Procedures
resolves10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00124-8
Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002
Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
resolves10.1007/978-3-540-78524-8_15
Bridging Game Theory and Cryptography: Recent Results and Future Directions
resolves10.1287/moor.17.1.175
Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions
resolves10.1287/moor.25.4.552.12113
On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2003.12.005
Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.005
Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00357
Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
resolves10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00116-7
Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
resolves10.3982/te944
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.009
Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals
The 2 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedDistributed computing meets game theory: Robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation
no DOI — not checkedref28
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