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Let the Right 'One' Win: Policy Lessons from the New Economics of Platforms

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2524368
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22/22 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-29

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

145 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 22 checked references that resolve
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