Reference health
Judicial Error and Cooperation
1 of 59 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-27
At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.
2 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.1037//0022-3514.51.1.110
The 58 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1257/aer.102.7.3317
Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.003
Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision
resolves10.1073/pnas.1105456108
Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans
resolves10.1086/518545
On the Psychology of Loss Aversion: Possession, Valence, and Reversals of the Endowment Effect: Table 1
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.011
Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
resolves10.1007/s10058-012-0120-z
Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments
resolves10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1977853
Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Reciprocal Responses to Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission
resolves10.1257/aer.100.5.2205
Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy
resolves10.1007/s11166-011-9131-3
Deterrence, expected cost, uncertainty and voting: Experimental evidence
resolves10.1017/s0022381609990235
Enforcement and Compliance in an Uncertain World: An Experimental Investigation
resolves10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.09.007
Who to punish? Individual decisions and majority rule in mitigating the free rider problem
resolves10.1257/aer.97.1.298
Do Workers Work More if Wages Are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
resolves10.1257/aer.100.1.541
Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
resolves10.1111/j.1740-1461.2010.01197.x
Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt—A Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions Under Uncertainty
resolves10.1016/j.joep.2009.04.004
Motivating teammates: The leader’s choice between positive and negative incentives
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1756791
State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
resolves10.1111/jeea.12006
IDENTIFYING SOCIAL NORMS USING COORDINATION GAMES: WHY DOES DICTATOR GAME SHARING VARY?
resolves10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.06.004
Institution formation and cooperation with heterogeneous agents
resolves10.1093/restud/rdt022
Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.12.004
Social preferences and voting: An exploration using a novel preference revealing mechanism
resolves10.1093/cesifo/ift016
In Dubio Pro Reo. Behavioral Explanations of Pro-defendant Bias in Procedures
resolves10.1098/rspb.2008.1082
Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation
resolves10.1007/s11127-011-9867-y
Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937x.2010.00608.x
Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
resolves10.1016/j.joep.2012.11.005
Can strategic uncertainty help deter tax evasion? An experiment on auditing rules
resolves10.1098/rspb.2012.0937
An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons
resolves10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00444.x
Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non‐deterrent*
resolves10.1007/s10683-013-9367-7
The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract
The 2 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedAre We Taxing Ourselves? How Deliberation and Experience Shape Voting on Taxes
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