Reference health
Controlling Shareholders’ Value, Long-Run Firm Value and Short-Term Performance
33/33 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
3 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 33 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/j.jempfin.2008.05.002
Understanding the relationship between founder–CEOs and firm performance
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.017
The structure and formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhn055
Intragroup Propping: Evidence from the Stock-Price Effects of Earnings Announcements by Korean Business Groups
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00510
Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00075-2
The value of durable bank relationships: evidence from Korean banking shocks
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01062.x
Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.04.002
Mixing family with business: A study of Thai business groups and the families behind them
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00512
Internal Capital Markets in Financial Conglomerates: Evidence from Small Bank Responses to Monetary Policy
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.08.012
Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong☆
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00511
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.05.012
Propping and tunneling: Empirical evidence from Japanese keiretsu
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.09.008
Affiliated firms and financial support: Evidence from Indian business groups
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
resolves10.1016/j.pacfin.2006.03.004
Executive compensation, firm performance, and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00229
Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.12.044
Tunneling and propping: A justification for pyramidal ownership
The 3 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref27
no DOI — not checkedOwnership structure of chaebols: statistics, concepts, and analysis
no DOI — not checkedGroup control motive as a determinant of ownership structure in business conglomerates: evidence from Korea's chaebols. Pacific-Basin Finance
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