Reference health

Mandatory Minimum Contributions, Heterogenous Endowments and Voluntary Public-Good Provision

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2539601
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1 of 48 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-27

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

13 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.1111/1468-0297.00205
The 47 checked references that resolve
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The ?crowding-out? effect of governmental transfers on private charitable contributions
resolves10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00035-8
A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games
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Is crowding out due entirely to fundraising? Evidence from a panel of charities
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On the private provision of public goods
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An economic model of moral motivation
resolves10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00232-3
Crowding-out voluntary contributions to public goods
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Hardnose the Dictator
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.010
The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on public good contributions: evidence from the lab
resolves10.1023/A:1020832203804
House Money Effects in Public Good Experiments
resolves10.1086/468036
Expressive Law And Economics
resolves10.1515/9780691233376
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resolves10.1257/jep.2.3.187
Anomalies: Cooperation
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resolves10.1257/aer.96.5.1611
The Hidden Costs of Control
resolves10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9
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resolves10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4
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resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.1993.tb00897.x
DOES MONITORING INCREASE WORK EFFORT? THE RIVALRY WITH TRUST AND LOYALTY
resolves10.1177/1043463194006003004
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resolves10.1111/1467-6419.00150
Motivation Crowding Theory
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.004
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resolves10.1016/j.irle.2014.03.001
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Voting for Burden Sharing Rules in Public Goods Games
resolves10.1086/468061
A Fine is a Price
resolves10.1162/003355300554917
Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All*
resolves10.1111/j.1813-6982.2007.00127.x
INCOME INEQUALITY, RECIPROCITY AND PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
resolves10.1016/0165-1765(95)00769-5
Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2504559
Social Costs of Inequality Heterogeneous Endowments in Public-Good Experiments
resolves10.1111/1467-9442.00182
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
resolves10.1037/h0035519
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resolves10.3386/w2069
Individual Taxpayer Response to Tax Cuts 1982-1984 with Implications forthe Revenue Maximizing Tax Rate
resolves10.1086/226937
Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem
resolves10.1086/227094
Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem
resolves10.1111/j.1740-1461.2005.00032.x
Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance: The Effect of Third‐Party Expression in an Experimental Hawk/Dove Game
resolves10.1023/a:1024245522958
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resolves10.1257/jep.14.3.137
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resolves10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00005-x
Does the government crowd-out private donations? New evidence from a sample of non-profit firms
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resolves10.1111/j.1467-9930.1994.tb00115.x
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resolves10.1086/261212
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resolves10.1037/h0092976
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resolves10.1006/ceps.1999.1020
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resolves10.1016/0165-1765(83)90087-3
The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income
The 13 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAn Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis
no DOI — not checkedOn the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods
no DOI — not checkedIntrinsic Motivation and the Process of Learning
no DOI — not checkedref27
no DOI — not checkedDoes Pay Motivate Volunteers?
no DOI — not checkedThe Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out
no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedThe Online Recruitment System ORSEE 2.0 -A Guide for the Organization of Experiments in Economics
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedref43
no DOI — not checkedTaxation and the Veil of Ignorance -A Real Effort Experiment on the Laffer Curve
no DOI — not checkedref59
no DOI — not checkedref60
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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