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Managerial Ability, Credit Ratings, and the Cost of Debt
47/47 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
10 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 47 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.01.001
Firms' use of accounting discretion to influence their credit ratings
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.01.004
Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2633216
Managerial Ability and Firm Performance: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis
resolves10.2308/accr.2010.85.4.1131
What’s My Style? The Influence of Top Managers on Voluntary Corporate Financial Disclosure
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.06.002
Differential properties in the ratings of certified versus non-certified bond-rating agencies
resolves10.1016/s0378-4266(01)00189-3
The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses
resolves10.3386/w8752
Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence From the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks
resolves10.1093/restud/rdu045
The Impact of Competition on Management Quality: Evidence from Public Hospitals
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.01.001
The impact of issuer-pay on corporate bond rating properties: Evidence from Moody׳s and S&P׳s initial adoptions
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2015.2188
Does Regulatory Certification Affect the Information Content of Credit Ratings?
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.10.001
Management quality, certification, and initial public offerings
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.11.001
An empirical analysis of changes in credit rating properties: Timeliness, accuracy and volatility
resolves10.1093/rfs/hht032
How Do CEOs Matter? The Effect of Industry Expertise on Acquisition Returns
resolves10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.35
The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.02.007
CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most influence on earnings management?
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.001
Informational effects of regulation FD: evidence from rating agencies
resolves10.1111/j.1911-3846.2012.01170.x
Earnings Smoothing Activities of Firms to Manage Credit Ratings*
resolves10.2308/accr-50858
Rating Agency Adjustments to GAAP Financial Statements and Their Effect on Ratings and Credit Spreads
resolves10.2308/ajpt-50985
The Relation between Managerial Ability and Audit Fees and Going Concern Opinions
resolves10.1111/j.1539-6975.2011.01443.x
<scp>Dupes or Incompetents? An Examination of Management's Impact on Firm Distress</scp>
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00505
Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending
resolves10.1506/EQUA-NVJ9-E712-UKBJ
Institutional Ownership and the Extent to which Stock Prices Reflect Future Earnings*
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.015
Can investor-paid credit rating agencies improve the information quality of issuer-paid rating agencies?
resolves10.2307/2490859
Methodological Issues Related to the Estimation of Financial Distress Prediction Models
The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref18
no DOI — not checkedThe influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior
no DOI — not checkedThe impact of the Dodd-Frank Act's credit rating agency reform on public companies
no DOI — not checkedref46
no DOI — not checkedref49
no DOI — not checkedref50
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no DOI — not checkedref53
no DOI — not checkedThis sample includes firm-year observations for 2,943 non-financial and non-utility firms with ratings assigned by S&P for the period between 1987 and 2013. S&P's ratings are from Compustat. RATE is a numerical transformation of S&P ratings, decreasing in credit risk. MA_SCORE increases in managerial ability. ASSETS are in $ millions; SIZE is log assets; LEV measures financial leverage
no DOI — not checkedSUBORD indicates that the firm has subordinated debt; STDCFO measures operating cash flow volatility; DISTRESS is a distance to default risk measure; IH is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors; AQ is a measure of accounting quality, higher values of AQ indicate lower earnings quality. Panel B displays sample distribution over time for the samples used in credit rating analysis and cost of debt analysis. The 27 year sample spans three recessionary periods, according to the
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