Reference health

The Dark Side of Competition for Status

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2554463
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1 of 86 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-03

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

15 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

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The 15 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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