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Ambiguous Incentives and the Persistence of Effort: Experimental Evidence

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2554468
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35/35 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-02

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 35 checked references that resolve
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Effects of intermittent and continuous token reinforcement on bus ridership.
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Gaming and Strategic Ambiguity in Incentive Provision
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The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedAn online recruitment system for economic experiments
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no DOI — not checkedTheoretical and Empirical Studies of Learning
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