Reference health
Does Regulatory Independence Translate into a Higher Degree of Liberalization? - Evidence from EU Energy Regulators
2 of 74 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-27
At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.
40 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.1111/1468-0297.00204
does not resolve to a known work10.1787/g2f75102-en
The 72 checked references that resolve
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2012 9th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2012) [Copyright notice]
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Interessengruppen und Interessenvermittlung: Internationale Gemeinsamkeiten und österreichische Besonderheiten
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Concentration in the European electricity industry: The internal market as solution?
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Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical Tests of Conventional Wisdom
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Does globalization affect growth? Evidence from a new index of globalization
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On the Politics of the Regulatory Reform: Econometric Evidence from the OECD Countries
resolves10.1093/ww/9780199540884.013.u5375
Alphandéry, Edmond Gérard, (born 2 Sept. 1943), President, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, since 2014; Director: ENGIE (formerly Suez, then GDF Suez), since 2003; Néovacs, since 2011; Senior Adviser, Nomura France, since 2012
resolves10.1080/1350176022000046409
Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies: a comparative empirical analysis
resolves10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00374.x
The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors
resolves10.1177/0002716204271833
The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe
resolves10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00023.x
De facto independence after delegation: A fuzzy‐set analysis
resolves10.1080/13501760802662854
The role of independent regulatory agencies in policy-making: a comparative analysis
resolves10.1007/978-94-015-8603-0_7
Independent Agencies and the Delegation Problem: Theoretical and Normative Dimensions
resolves10.1017/s0143814x00003524
From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance
resolves10.1111/1467-937x.00114
The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs
resolves10.5089/9781451852097.001
The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure
resolves10.1007/s11127-006-9140-y
A race to liberalization? Diffusion of economic policy reform among OECD-economies
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6435.2008.00401.x
The Impact of Growth Performance and Political Regime Type on Economic Policy Liberalization
resolves10.1016/s0176-2680(03)00014-4
Do crises promote the extent of economic liberalization?: an empirical test
resolves10.1007/s11127-009-9414-2
Did globalization restrict partisan politics? An empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries
resolves10.1007/s11127-009-9494-z
Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries
resolves10.1080/1350176022000046445
Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe
resolves10.1080/713601588
Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Pressures, Functions and Contextual Mediation
resolves10.1016/j.eneco.2008.07.002
The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: A case of legislative and regulatory capture?
resolves10.1080/713601589
The Unanticipated Consequences of Creating Independent Competition Agencies
resolves10.2307/1911789
Alternative Tests of Independence between Stochastic Regressors and Disturbances: Finite Sample Results
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no DOI — not checkedThe Interaction of Aggregate-Demand Policies and Labor Market Reform
no DOI — not checkedThe European Union's Energy Security Challenges, CRS Report for Congress
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no DOI — not checkedElectricity Reform Abroad and U.S. Investment, Office of Energy Markets and End Use
no DOI — not checkedFree Movement of Capital: Commission Opens Infringement Proceedings against Spain Regarding Law Amending Functions of Spanish Electricity and Gas Regulator
no DOI — not checkedMergers: Commission Rules against Spanish Energy Regulator's Measures Concerning E.ON's Bid for Endesa
no DOI — not checkedMergers: Commission Decides that Spanish Measures in Proposed E.ON/Endesa Takeover Violate EC Law
no DOI — not checkedFree Movement of Capital: Commission Calls on Spain to Modify the Law Amending the Functions of the Spanish Electricity and Gas Regulator
no DOI — not checkedMerger: The European Commission Adopted a Statement of ObjectionsRegarding the Merger Project between Suez and Gaz de France
no DOI — not checkedMergers: Commission Opens Infringement Procedure against Spain for Not Lifting Unlawful Conditions Imposed by CNE on E.ON's Bid for Endesa
no DOI — not checkedMergers: Infringement Procedure against Spain for Not Lifting Unlawful Conditions Imposed on E.ON's Bid for Endesa
no DOI — not checkedMergers: Commission Refers Spain to Court for Not Lifting Unlawful Conditions Imposed on E.ON's Bid for Endesa
no DOI — not checkedDirective 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity
no DOI — not checkedDirective 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas
no DOI — not checkedConcerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity and Repealing Directive 2003/54/EC
no DOI — not checkedConcerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas and Repealing Directive 2003/55/EC
no DOI — not checkedIndependent Regulatory Authorities -A Comparative Study of European Energy Regulators
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no DOI — not checkedUnderstanding Economic Policy Reform
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no DOI — not checkedDiscretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government Commitment
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no DOI — not checkedUtility Regulators -The Independence Debate, Public Policy for the Private Sector
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no DOI — not checkedCharlemagne -The Nationalist Resurgence
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