Reference health

Who Should Pay for Two-Way Interconnection?

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2562386
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35/35 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-29

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 35 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042036
THE LOGIT AS A MODEL OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
resolves10.7551/mitpress/2450.001.0001
Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation
resolves10.1111/1468-0297.00304
Network Interconnection in Telecommunications
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02276.x
Mobile Call Termination
resolves10.2202/1538-0645.1334
Access Charges in the Presence of Call Externalities
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2004.07.003
Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing revisited
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02167.x
Network Competition and Entry Deterrence
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00365.x
INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND COMPETITION IN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS<sup>*</sup>
resolves10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00207.x
Efficient Intercarrier Compensation for Competing Networks When Customers Share the Value of A Call
resolves10.2307/1593778
Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing
resolves10.1016/j.infoecopol.2004.01.004
Network competition with heterogeneous customers and calling patterns
resolves10.1016/j.infoecopol.2010.09.001
Calling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulation
resolves10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00279-2
Using ‘bill and keep’ interconnect arrangements to soften network competition
resolves10.1016/s0167-7187(03)00003-1
Nonlinear pricing of telecommunications with call and network externalities
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2176134
Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the UK with an Application to the Orange/T-Mobile Merger
resolves10.2307/1593701
Sender or Receiver: Who Should Pay to Exchange an Electronic Message?
resolves10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00292.x
Customer or Complementor? Intercarrier Compensation with Two‐Sided Benefits
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12046
Calling circles: network competition with nonuniform calling patterns
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.06.002
Promoting network competition by regulating termination charges
resolves10.1016/j.telpol.2011.11.008
The welfare effects of mobile termination rate regulation in asymmetric oligopolies: The case of Spain
resolves10.1111/ecoj.12097
Mobile Termination, Network Externalities and Consumer Expectations
resolves10.2307/1593731
On the "Receiver-Pays" Principle
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.05.006
Termination fees revisited
resolves10.1016/s0167-6245(01)00036-1
An economic analysis of the receiver pays principle
resolves10.2307/2555814
Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing
resolves10.2307/2555815
Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12261
Buyer power and mutual dependency in a model of negotiations
resolves10.2307/1593723
Internet Interconnection and the Off-Net-Cost Pricing Principle
resolves10.1016/j.telpol.2006.01.002
Mobile termination charges: Calling Party Pays versus Receiving Party Pays
resolves10.1016/j.infoecopol.2011.02.001
Mobile termination rates and the receiver-pays regime
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1516207
Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination
resolves10.1016/j.infoecopol.2004.01.003
Competition in telecommunications: an introduction
resolves10.2307/1911129
Applied Welfare Economics with Discrete Choice Models
resolves10.1007/s11149-005-3955-1
Mobile Termination: What is the “Right” Charge?*
resolves10.1257/jel.41.3.830
Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe theory of access pricing and interconnection
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedref18
no DOI — not checkedref19
no DOI — not checkedref22
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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