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Price Discrimination with Loss Averse Consumers

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2587619
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1 of 46 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-05

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

6 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

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The 45 checked references that resolve
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New York City Cab Drivers' Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income
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Selling to Overconfident Consumers
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Screening Loss Averse Consumers
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Competition and Price Variation when Consumers Are Loss Averse
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Exploiting Naïvete about Self-Control in the Credit Market
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Regular prices and sales
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UNCERTAIN DEMAND, CONSUMER LOSS AVERSION, AND FLAT-RATE TARIFFS
resolves10.1257/aer.100.5.2451
Binary Payment Schemes: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion
resolves10.1007/bf00820768
Ticket pricing policy and box office revenue
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Behavioral Contract Theory
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Reference-Dependent Risk Attitudes
resolves10.1257/aer.99.3.909
Reference-Dependent Consumption Plans
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Price Discrimination in Broadway Theater
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resolves10.1162/qjec.121.3.783
Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance*
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Monopoly and product quality
resolves10.1287/mksc.1080.0449
Optimal Product Line Design When Consumers Exhibit Choice Set-Dependent Preferences
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12139
Selling substitute goods to loss‐averse consumers: limited availability, bargains, and rip‐offs
resolves10.1007/s001820000038
Loss aversion equilibrium
resolves10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195398717.001.0001
Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization
resolves10.1007/s00199-011-0619-5
Monopoly pricing when consumers are antagonized by unexpected price increases: a “cover version” of the Heidhues–Kőszegi–Rabin model
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The 6 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAn Economic Guide to Ticket Pricing in the Entertainment Industry
no DOI — not checkedThe Pricing of Art and the Art of Pricing
no DOI — not checkedref15
no DOI — not checkedConsumer Optimism and Price Discrimination
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedA Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences
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