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Regulatory Influence on Market Conditions in the Banking Union

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2613802
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1 of 22 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-04

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

39 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.2139/ssrn.2231317
The 21 checked references that resolve
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Kapitel 8. Anreizwirkungen und Abwicklungsfähigkeit nach der BRRD
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Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision and Regulation?
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Macroeconomic Shocks and Banking Regulation
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Frequently Asked Questions
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The European Single Supervisory Mechanism
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A Critical Evaluation of Bail-Ins as Bank Recapitalisation Mechanisms
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SHOULD THE FUNCTIONS OF MONETARY POLICY AND BANKING SUPERVISION BE SEPARATED?
resolves10.1257/jep.25.1.3
A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation
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EU Regular Economic Report 4
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Bail-in clauses1
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The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture
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Governance of the Single Supervisory Mechanism: Some Reflections
resolves10.1016/0378-4266(77)90015-2
An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory
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The 39 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedWhile the BRRD provides an option for Member States to empower their RAs to ultimately make the critical determination, BRRD, art. 32(2), the SRB is generally authorized to draw an autonomous conclusion in this regard
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no DOI — not checkedof State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis, OJ C 216, 30.7.2013, p. 1. Moreover, at least the then incumbent Commission stood its ground in the face of high-level calls not to destroy investor confidence with harsh bail-in rules
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no DOI — not checkedBrussels stands ground against Mario Draghi over bailout curbs, Financial Times Online
no DOI — not checkedAssessing the risk of banking crises -revisited
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no DOI — not checkedOperationalising the selection and application of macroprudential instruments
no DOI — not checkedBail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital to Mitigate Systemic Risk, Columbia Law
no DOI — not checkedRegulators and Rules-President Obama's Reforms vs
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no DOI — not checkedMacro-prudential Policy Objectives and Tools
no DOI — not checkedThe ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macro-prudential Policy in the Banking Sector
no DOI — not checkedPress Release, A Single Resolution Mechanism for the Banking Union
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no DOI — not checkedLegal Aspects of Bail-Ins
no DOI — not checkedBank Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What it Would Take, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18/2014, Columbia Law
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no DOI — not checkedInternational Spillovers and Guidelines for Policy Cooperation
no DOI — not checkedWhen More Is Needed: The European Financial Supervisory Reform and Its Legal Basis
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no DOI — not checkedEU Financial Market Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis
no DOI — not checkedReforms of EU Banking and Securities Regulation After the Financial Crisis
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no DOI — not checkedThis Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, Princeton University Press Schweikhard FA and Tsesmelidakis Z (2012) The Impact of Government Interventions on CDS and Equity Markets, American Finance Association
no DOI — not checkedFinancial Stability and Monetary Policy: How Closely Interlinked?
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no DOI — not checkedOrganizational Choices of Banks and the Effective Supervision of Transnational Financial Institutions
no DOI — not checkedThe Single Supervisory Mechanism -Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation?
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