Reference health

Bank Payout Policy, Performance, and Insider Trading in the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2621772
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37/37 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-12

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

12 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 37 checked references that resolve
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Bank Capital and Dividend Externalities
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhw088
Measuring Systemic Risk
resolves10.1016/S1574-0102(03)01011-2
Payout Policy
resolves10.2307/3003330
Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02723.x
Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future or the Past?
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.12.005
The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks perform better?
resolves10.1016/S0378-4266(96)00004-0
The stock-market reaction to dividend cuts and omissions by commercial banks
resolves10.1016/S0378-4266(99)00097-7
Asymmetric information, dividend reductions, and contagion effects in bank stock returns
resolves10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.01.002
Financial crisis and bank executive incentive compensation
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(91)90032-F
Event-study methodology under conditions of event-induced variance
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.07.004
Payout policy in the 21st century
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x
On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance
resolves10.1111/jofi.12225
Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(94)90019-1
An examination of voluntary versus involuntary security issuances by commercial banks
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2017.08.002
Trading by bank insiders before and during the 2007–2008 financial crisis
resolves10.1093/rof/rft001
Corporate Governance Rules and Insider Trading Profits
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.07.005
Dividend policy and the earned/contributed capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory☆
resolves10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00491.x
Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market
resolves10.2307/2331110
The Information Content of Dividend Changes: Cash Flow Signaling, Overinvestment, and Dividend Clienteles
resolves10.1111/jofi.12057
Stronger Risk Controls, Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.010
Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis
resolves10.1080/01621459.1968.10480917
Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.08.002
Payout policy through the financial crisis: The growth of repurchases and the resilience of dividends
resolves10.1111/j.1475-6803.1988.tb00089.x
AN ANALYSIS OF SHAREHOLDER REACTION TO DIVIDEND CUTS AND OMISSIONS
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00765.x
Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy
resolves10.1086/339889
Are Dividend Changes a Sign of Firm Maturity?
resolves10.1017/S0022109010000633
Has the Propensity to Pay Out Declined?
resolves10.2307/2951583
Trimmed Lad and Least Squares Estimation of Truncated and Censored Regression Models with Fixed Effects
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02363.x
Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00095-2
When a buyback isn’t a buyback: open market repurchases and employee options
resolves10.1016/j.jfs.2015.01.006
The Capital Purchase Program and subsequent bank SEOs
resolves10.1093/rfs/14.1.79
Are Insider Trades Informative?
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.09.003
Bank governance, regulation and risk taking
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04796.x
Price Reactions to Dividend Initiations and Omissions: Overreaction or Drift?
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02362.x
Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhp027
What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their Trading
resolves10.1111/1475-679X.00115
The Relation Between Insider‐Trading Restrictions and Executive Compensation
The 12 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedref4
no DOI — not checkedThe wages of failure: Executive compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman
no DOI — not checkedThe influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior
no DOI — not checkedref27
no DOI — not checkedFinancing payouts, Working paper
no DOI — not checkedThe panic of
no DOI — not checkedBank holding company dividends and repurchases during the financial crisis
no DOI — not checkedBanking on bank dividends
no DOI — not checkedInvestors lick wounds from dividend cuts
no DOI — not checkedDividend policy and capital retention: a systemic "first response
no DOI — not checkedTroubled Asset Relief Program: Two Year Retrospective
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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