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On the Importance of Uniform Sharing Rules for Efficient Matching

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2622664
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1 of 39 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-05

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

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References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2312726
The 38 checked references that resolve
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The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
resolves10.2307/2233467
On the Fixed Nature of Sharecropping Contracts
resolves10.1086/260084
A Theory of Marriage: Part I
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00638.x
Robust Mechanism Design
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00317
Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
resolves10.1007/bf01461154
Beweis der Invarianz der Dimensionenzahl
resolves10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
resolves10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00452.x
EFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS*
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.004
Two-sided matching with interdependent values
resolves10.1086/451322
Tenure Systems in Traditional China
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.008
Efficient assignment with interdependent values
resolves10.1086/466560
The Problem of Social Cost
resolves10.1006/jeth.2001.2797
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
resolves10.2307/1913602
Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
resolves10.2307/1913320
Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers
resolves10.1162/003355300554755
Efficient Auctions
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2357087
Two-Sided Investments and Matching with Multi-Dimensional Types and Attributes
resolves10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00109-1
Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade
resolves10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.004
The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2009.01.002
Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
resolves10.1007/bf01213255
The nonatomic assignment model
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00517.x
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00675.x
The Limits of ex post Implementation
resolves10.1007/s00199-007-0300-1
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00240
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
resolves10.2307/1912821
A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
resolves10.3982/ecta11183
Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2021900
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
resolves10.3982/te1189
Pricing and investments in matching markets
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00546.x
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
resolves10.1017/ccol052139015x
Two-Sided Matching
resolves10.1007/bf01753437
The assignment game I: The core
resolves10.1007/bf02706316
Identifying and quantifying anti-export bias: The case of Cameroon
resolves10.1515/9781400822539
Supermodularity and Complementarity
resolves10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9_28
Stability of optimal transport
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1687144
Incentive Compatible Market Design with Applications
resolves10.1257/mic.5.4.120
Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedEx post implementation in environments with private goods
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedThe Characterization of Implementable Choice Rules
no DOI — not checkedref39
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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