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The Interlinking Doctrine: Judicial Non-Delegation and Federal Common Law
1 of 50 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-28
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References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2626876
The 49 checked references that resolve
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Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions
resolves10.1093/ww/9780199540884.013.282528
Harmes, Stephen Douglas, (born 29 May 1959), a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts), since 2014
resolves10.1163/1874-6772_seg_a3_298
Attica. IG III 1176 corr. id. l.c. 63 sq., n. 94 cum tab. LXXIV.
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2332248
Hitting the Target: How New Disclosure Rules Could Improve the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
resolves10.1163/ilwo-vf25
V.F.25 Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region (SREP Convention) (24 Nov 86). See Basic Document V.C.6, supra
resolves10.4000/assr.1487
Religion, Law, and Freedom. A Global Perspective (cf. Arch. supra. Nathalie Luca)
resolves10.1093/ww/9780199540884.013.u29209
Nathan, 2nd Baron, (Roger Carol Michael Nathan) (5 Dec. 1922–19 July 2007)
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no DOI — not checkedBut see Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal
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no DOI — not checkedSchechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L
no DOI — not checkeddissenting); see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-STITIUTIONAL LAW � 5-19
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no DOI — not checkedRule 9 of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study on the Need for Reform of the Rules Enabling Acts
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no DOI — not checkedWaiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules
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no DOI — not checkedsupra note 26, at 286 n.244; Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes
no DOI — not checkedQuasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND
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no DOI — not checked354. Schoenbrod, on the other hand, argues that vague statutes are (invalid) delegations only if they require "lawmaking" rather than "interpretation
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no DOI — not checkedStatutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN
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no DOI — not checkedholding that an Eighth Amendment violation can be obvious even if the exact same conduct hasn't been held unconstitutional before, because "officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances"), with id
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no DOI — not checkedWhen Money Is Tight, Is Strict Scrutiny Loose?: Cost Sensitivity as a Compelling Governmental Interest Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 14 TEX
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no DOI — not checkedBut see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV
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no DOI — not checkedIt's clear, then, that the Supreme Court has long understood itself, and continues to understand itself, as participating in the ongoing development of a preexisting common-law action on Congress's command. 479 Oldham attacks the statute in at least two ways. On the one hand, he uses the literal language of the statute as a non-delegation argument: Perhaps banning all contracts and firms has an intelligible principle, but that's not what Congress intended. And explicitly banning all contracts and firms while implicitly wanting judges to exempt whatever conduct they like lacks self-evidently grants too 477 Id
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no DOI — not checkedBut thinking about delegations to the judiciary should make us appreciate that the Inherent-Powers Corollary is actually central to understanding the non-delegation doctrine generally. First, when we think about the judiciary as delegate, we realize just how extensive judicial power is. The power to make procedural rules is significant, though in a narrow field; and as for federal common law, even though the Erie doctrine (which is not primarily about non-delegation) conditions us to think it doesn't exist, it's miscellaneous and interstitial, but ubiquitous. Of course the scope of federal common law is controversial, so your mileage may vary
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