Reference health

Dynamic Trading with Developing Adverse Selection

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2646669
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26/26 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

3 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 26 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2139/ssrn.3003562
Middlemen as Information Intermediaries: Evidence from Used Car Markets
resolves10.1093/restud/rdw014
Trading Dynamics with Adverse Selection and Search: Market Freeze, Intervention and Recovery
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2565976
Imperfect Information Transmission and Adverse Selection in Asset Markets
resolves10.3982/ecta9278
Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00706.x
Bargaining with Interdependent Values
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00639.x
Over-the-Counter Markets
resolves10.2307/2297497
Sequential Bargaining with Correlated Values
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00565.x
Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining
resolves10.3982/te2237
Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information
resolves10.1257/aer.100.3.802
Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511528309.006
Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information
resolves10.3386/w17876
Dynamic Adverse Selection: A Theory of Illiquidity, Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(86)90024-4
Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture
resolves10.1007/978-3-658-02248-8_17
Rethinking the financial network
resolves10.3982/ecta6917
Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
resolves10.3982/te1566
Transparency and price formation
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.012
Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons
resolves10.3982/ecta9969
Search With Adverse Selection
resolves10.21799/frbp.wp.2017.35
Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets
resolves10.1257/mac.4.1.1
Contagious Adverse Selection
resolves10.1257/aer.102.1.1
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection
resolves10.1111/1467-937x.00115
Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
resolves10.1257/aer.102.1.29
Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market Functioning
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(89)90119-1
Bargaining with common values
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2798088
Learning-by-Owning in a Lemons Market
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhr140
Finding a Good Price in Opaque Over-the-Counter Markets
The 3 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedref12
no DOI — not checkedTrading Dynamics in the Market for Lemons
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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