Reference health
Stock Price Informativeness and Executive Compensation
53/53 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
3 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 53 checked references that resolve
resolves10.3386/w5648
Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00579
Performance Incentives within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00388.x
Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets
resolves10.2139/ssrn.266180
An Empirical Analysis of Analysts' Target Prices: Short Term Informativeness and Long Term Dynamics
resolves10.1007/s11142-012-9215-6
Stock option grant vesting terms: economic and financial reporting determinants
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2664198
CEO Compensation and Stock Mispricing: How Do Boards React to Mutual Fund Flow-Driven Price Pressure?
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.08.002
Do stock prices influence corporate decisions? Evidence from the technology bubble
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.10.002
Do analysts matter for governance? Evidence from natural experiments
resolves10.1111/1475-679x.00064
Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility
resolves10.1111/jofi.12042
The Real Effects of Financial Shocks: Evidence from Exogenous Changes in Analyst Coverage
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01569.x
Presidential Address: Asset Price Dynamics with Slow‐Moving Capital
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01738.x
The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of Prices on Takeovers
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00577
Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.01.006
Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.05.007
An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.021
Monitoring and corporate disclosure: Evidence from a natural experiment
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01750.x
Mutual Fund Trading Pressure: Firm‐Level Stock Price Impact and Timing of SEOs
resolves10.2307/2491081
An Analysis of the use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.06.003
Stock option vesting conditions, CEO turnover, and myopic investment
resolves10.2307/2937861
Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior
The 3 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedref49
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