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Modelling of the Elective Allocation Process as a Simultaneous Ascending Auction

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2706732
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1 of 18 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-27

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

4 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.1162/105864097567165
The 17 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1162/154247604323068168
Auctioning Many Divisible Goods
resolves10.2202/1534-5955.1019
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.004
Information revelation in auctions
resolves10.1111/1468-0297.00020
The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences
resolves10.1007/s001990050220
Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00455
Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00197
Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
resolves10.1111/1467-6419.00083
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
resolves10.2307/1911865
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
resolves10.1086/262118
Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511813825
Putting Auction Theory to Work
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00778.x
Package Auctions and Exchanges
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00056
On the Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-unit Auctions
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00335
The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2006.12.004
Continuous ascending vs. pooled multiple unit auctions
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
resolves10.1515/9781400830138.107
3 The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions
The 4 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedCo-Evolutionary Auction Mechanism Design
no DOI — not checkedAuctions and Bidding Games
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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