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Do Locally-Based Independent Directors Reduce Corporate Misconduct?

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2713231
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2 of 50 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-28

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

26 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

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The 26 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref19
no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedWhy do companies hire nonlocal independent director
no DOI — not checkedBackground of independent directors and corporate performance
no DOI — not checkedThe listed-company's fraud in statement and the supervision and penalty of independent directors: an analysis based on the perspective of the individual independent director
no DOI — not checkedOwnership concentration, outside blockholders, and operating performance: evidence from China's listed companies
no DOI — not checkedref57
no DOI — not checkedref58
no DOI — not checkedThe independence of independent directors: evidence from board voting behavior
no DOI — not checkedThe relationship between politics, institutional environments and private enterprises' access to bank loans
no DOI — not checkedPolitical connections, rent seeking, and the fiscal subsidy efficiency of local governments
no DOI — not checkedref63
no DOI — not checkedFinancial fraud, family control and executives' turnover in listed company
no DOI — not checkedwhen MAGNITUDE are 1, 2, and 3 respectively, the corresponding marginal effects of LOC_RATIO*POL
no DOI — not checkedwhen MAGNITUDE are 1, 2, and 3 respectively, the corresponding marginal effects of LOC_NUM*FEMALE are -0.0087 (P value = 0.1373), -0.0059 (P value = 0.1409), and -0.0026 (P value = 0.1407). In Column (5), when MAGNITUDE are 1, 2, and 3 respectively, the corresponding marginal effects of LOC_RATIO*FEMALE
no DOI — not checkedwhen MAGNITUDE are 1, 2, and 3 respectively, the corresponding marginal effects of LOC_NUM*EDU are 0.0001 (P value = 0.9409), 0.0001 (P value = 0.9409), and 0.0000 (P value = 0.9409)
no DOI — not checkedPaired data analyses: paired subsample analyses on misconduct observations that are in the same year, industry, and similar size of assets. 2. Lagged variable analyses: the local enrolment variable
no DOI — not checkedref70
no DOI — not checkedref71
no DOI — not checkedref72
no DOI — not checkedref73
no DOI — not checkedref74
no DOI — not checkedref75
no DOI — not checkedLocal plus political connection and local plus female?change moderators POL into POLG (independent directors who are both local and politically connected), FEMALE into FEMALEG (independent directors who are both local and female)
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