At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in
Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the
registry record that put it there.
The 48 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2017.2736Board Structure Mandates: Consequences for Director Location and Financial Reporting
resolves10.1504/ijlic.2007.016337Proximity as a communication resource for competitiveness: a rationale for technology clusters
resolves10.3386/w11697Do Local Analysts Know More? A Cross-Country Study of the Performance of Local Analysts and Foreign Analysts
resolves10.2308/acch.2000.14.4.441Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Consideration of Industry Traits and Corporate Governance Mechanisms
resolves10.2469/dig.v27.n2.79An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud
resolves10.1057/crr.2009.15Does Female Representation on Boards of Directors Associate with the ‘Most Ethical Companies’ List?
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2013.1892Are All Independent Directors Equally Informed? Evidence Based on Their Trading Returns and Social Networks
resolves10.1016/s0278-4254(00)00015-6Association between independent non-executive directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong
resolves10.1007/s11142-015-9316-0Does increased board independence reduce earnings management? Evidence from recent regulatory reforms
resolves10.2308/ajpt-10241Geographic Proximity between Auditor and Client: How Does It Impact Audit Quality?
resolves10.1007/s10551-007-9545-7Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories: What Can We Learn for Designing Corporate Ethics Programs?
resolves10.1007/s10551-008-9710-7Exploring the Geography of Corporate Philanthropic Disaster Response: A Study of Fortune Global 500 Firms
resolves10.2139/ssrn.249557Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?
resolves10.1007/bf02221047The changing of the guard: Top management characteristics, organizational strain, and antitrust offending
resolves10.1007/s10551-007-9503-4The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Has It Brought About Changes in the Boards of Large U. S. Corporations?
resolves10.2307/2393700Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection
resolves10.2307/256871COLLABORATION IN THE BOARDROOM: BEHAVIORAL AND PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES OF CEO-BOARD SOCIAL TIES.
resolves10.1023/A:1021626024014Women on Corporate Boards of Directors and their Influence on Corporate Philanthropy
resolves10.1007/s10551-012-1294-6Antecedents of Corporate Scandals: CEOs’ Personal Traits, Stakeholders’ Cohesion, Managerial Fraud, and Imbalanced Corporate Strategy
The 26 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref19
no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedWhy do companies hire nonlocal independent director
no DOI — not checkedBackground of independent directors and corporate performance
no DOI — not checkedThe listed-company's fraud in statement and the supervision and penalty of independent directors: an analysis based on the perspective of the individual independent director
no DOI — not checkedOwnership concentration, outside blockholders, and operating performance: evidence from China's listed companies
no DOI — not checkedref57
no DOI — not checkedref58
no DOI — not checkedThe independence of independent directors: evidence from board voting behavior
no DOI — not checkedThe relationship between politics, institutional environments and private enterprises' access to bank loans
no DOI — not checkedPolitical connections, rent seeking, and the fiscal subsidy efficiency of local governments
no DOI — not checkedref63
no DOI — not checkedFinancial fraud, family control and executives' turnover in listed company
no DOI — not checkedwhen MAGNITUDE are 1, 2, and 3 respectively, the corresponding marginal effects of LOC_RATIO*POL
no DOI — not checkedwhen MAGNITUDE are 1, 2, and 3 respectively, the corresponding marginal effects of LOC_NUM*FEMALE are -0.0087 (P value = 0.1373), -0.0059 (P value = 0.1409), and -0.0026 (P value = 0.1407). In Column (5), when MAGNITUDE are 1, 2, and 3 respectively, the corresponding marginal effects of LOC_RATIO*FEMALE
no DOI — not checkedwhen MAGNITUDE are 1, 2, and 3 respectively, the corresponding marginal effects of LOC_NUM*EDU are 0.0001 (P value = 0.9409), 0.0001 (P value = 0.9409), and 0.0000 (P value = 0.9409)
no DOI — not checkedPaired data analyses: paired subsample analyses on misconduct observations that are in the same year, industry, and similar size of assets. 2. Lagged variable analyses: the local enrolment variable
no DOI — not checkedref70
no DOI — not checkedref71
no DOI — not checkedref72
no DOI — not checkedref73
no DOI — not checkedref74
no DOI — not checkedref75
no DOI — not checkedLocal plus political connection and local plus female?change moderators POL into POLG (independent directors who are both local and politically connected), FEMALE into FEMALEG (independent directors who are both local and female)
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