Reference health

What Makes Law to Change Behavior? An Experimental Study

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2721597
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43/43 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

13 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 43 checked references that resolve
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The Republic of Beliefs: A New Approach to ‘Law and Economics’
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More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding
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Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?
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Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts
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The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures
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The Expressive Function of Trade Secret Law: Legality, Cost, Intrinsic Motivation, and Consensus
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Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information
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The 13 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedThe complexity of disentangling intrinsic and extrinsic compliance motivations: Theoretical and empirical insights from the behavioral analysis of law
no DOI — not checkedHuman pro-social motivation and the maintenance of social order
no DOI — not checkedAn online recruitment system for economic experiments
no DOI — not checkedCompliance and the power of authority
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