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Asymmetric Information in Auctions: Are Resellers Better Appraisers?

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2736141
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27/27 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-17

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 27 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/1879431
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
resolves10.1111/1467-937x.00041
Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2002.00435.x
Identification of Standard Auction Models
resolves10.2307/1593721
The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions
resolves10.1177/0022002783027004003
I Won the Auction But Don't Want the Prize
resolves10.1257/aer.90.4.1034
Learning and Forgetting: The Dynamics of Aircraft Production
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511811241
Microeconometrics
resolves10.2118/2993-pa
Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations
resolves10.2307/1057065
Implications of the Auction Mechanism in Baseball's Free Agent Draft
resolves10.1007/bf02680402
The growing gap in book industry statistics
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00561.x
Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Mauritian Slave Auctions
resolves10.1016/0304-4068(83)90034-4
Competitive bidding and proprietary information
resolves10.1016/0167-2681(94)90105-8
Learning in common value auctions: Some initial observations
resolves10.1257/aer.91.3.399
Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest Service Timber Sales
resolves10.2307/2951754
Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
resolves10.1111/1467-937x.00229
Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement
resolves10.1016/s0304-4076(02)00199-9
Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions
resolves10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00025.x
Learning by bidding
resolves10.1515/9781400830138.107
3 The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions
resolves10.2307/2171804
Econometrics of First-Price Auctions
resolves10.1257/aer.101.4.1535
Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors
resolves10.2307/1911865
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
resolves10.1086/296325
The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers
resolves10.1257/00028280260344632
Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1872465
Information Disclosure as a Matching Mechanism: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment
resolves10.1257/jep.2.1.191
Anomalies: The Winner's Curse
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe Winner's Curse in Bilateral Negotiations
no DOI — not checkedref13
no DOI — not checkedIntimidation or Impatience?
no DOI — not checkedAn Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedref30
no DOI — not checkedref34
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