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Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2744535
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65/65 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-20

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

18 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

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The 18 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedThe Economics of Illegal Logging and Associated Trade. Paper for the round table on Sustainable Development
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