Reference health

Jumping to Conclusions? Passive Bayesian Learning and the Optimal Timing of Judgment

2 of 45 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-09-13

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

2 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.1037//0033-295x.102.4.684

does not resolve to a known work10.1037//1089-2680.2.2.175

The 43 checked references that resolve

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Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

resolves10.1017/S0003055406062113

Deliberation, Preference Uncertainty, and Voting Rules

resolves10.1093/restud/rds030

Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets

resolves10.1007/s11238-011-9260-9

Is specialization desirable in committee decision making?

resolves10.1037/a0026450

Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.

resolves10.1257/aer.20140117

Revealed Preference, Rational Inattention, and Costly Information Acquisition

resolves10.2307/2586018

In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting

resolves10.2307/1882186

A Stochastic Learning Model of Economic Behavior

resolves10.1016/j.jedc.2011.09.008

Good timing: The economics of optimal stopping

resolves10.1080/01621459.1974.10480137

Reaching a Consensus

resolves10.1037/a0013344

On measuring quantitative interpretations of reasonable doubt.

resolves10.1016/0022-0531(71)90013-5

A model of price adjustment

resolves10.2307/2585926

Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting

resolves10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.002

Deliberative voting

resolves10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.007

Information acquisition in committees

resolves10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.02.002

Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey

resolves10.4159/jla.v1i1.10

Extremism and Social Learning

resolves10.1257/mic.2.1.112

Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds

resolves10.1037/a0026884

How the Bayesians got their beliefs (and what those beliefs actually are): Comment on Bowers and Davis (2012).

resolves10.1017/CBO9780511752896

Inside the Juror

resolves10.1037/a0025940

Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: How noisy information processing can bias human decision making.

resolves10.1080/01621459.1963.10500830

Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables

resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.006

Simultaneous versus sequential information processing

resolves10.1037//1076-8971.3.2-3.285

Reasonable doubt instructions: Commonsense justice and standard of proof.

resolves10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.002

Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting

resolves10.1002/wcs.80

Bayesian learning theory applied to human cognition

resolves10.1017/cbo9780511809477

Judgment under Uncertainty

resolves10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00027-0

Relative entropy in sequential decision problems

resolves10.2139/ssrn.1702940

Sequential Deliberation

resolves10.1177/0956797613495418

How Robust Are Probabilistic Models of Higher-Level Cognition?

resolves10.1093/jleo/19.1.24

Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem

resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2006.10.007

Votes based on protracted deliberations

resolves10.1257/aer.102.6.2410

Modeling the Change of Paradigm: Non-Bayesian Reactions to Unexpected News

resolves10.1111/0034-6527.00280

Committee Design with Endogenous Information

resolves10.1162/003355399555945

First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias

resolves10.1111/jeea.12104

SELECTIVE ATTENTION AND LEARNING

resolves10.1007/s11127-010-9691-9

Communication in committees: who should listen?

resolves10.2307/3053534

Formal and Empirical Research on Cascaded Inference in Jurisprudence

resolves10.1016/s0304-3932(03)00029-1

Implications of rational inattention

resolves10.1006/jeth.2000.2701

Economists' Models of Learning

resolves10.1126/science.1192788

How to Grow a Mind: Statistics, Structure, and Abstraction

resolves10.2307/1905331

Foundations of a General Theory of Sequential Decision Functions

resolves10.3982/ecta12188

Bounded Memory and Biases in Information Processing

The 2 references without a DOI — listed, not checked

no DOI — not checkedBurden of Proof

no DOI — not checkedref33

What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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