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Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2799269
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44/44 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-22

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

12 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 44 checked references that resolve
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Payout Policy
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Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning
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Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
resolves10.3982/ecta7261
Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard
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Dynamic Financial Contracting
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Payout policy in the 21st century
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Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model
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Preface
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Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis
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Testing Tradeoff and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt
resolves10.1093/restud/rds048
Insurance and Taxation over the Life Cycle
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A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependence
resolves10.2307/2297615
Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
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Dynamic Financial Contracting with Persistent Private Information
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Redistribution and Social Insurance
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Optimal Contracts for Experimentation
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resolves10.1111/1467-937x.00083
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resolves10.3982/te1439
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Efficient Allocations in Dynamic Private Information Economies with Persistent Shocks: A First-Order Approach
resolves10.2307/1911362
The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01772.x
A Lintner Model of Payout and Managerial Rents
resolves10.3982/ecta10269
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resolves10.2307/2297941
Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhq031
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Repeated Moral Hazard
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A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
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On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
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Persistent Private Information
The 12 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping
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no DOI — not checkedA Theory of Financing Contracts and Firm Dynamics
no DOI — not checkedref20
no DOI — not checkedref22
no DOI — not checkedref39
no DOI — not checkedDistribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings, and Taxes
no DOI — not checkedStock Valuation and Learning about Profitability
no DOI — not checkedref49
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