Reference health

Influence Activities, Coalitions, and Uniform Policies

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2799992
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39/39 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

11 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 39 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1111/1467-9957.00282
Coalitions and Networks in Industrial Organization
resolves10.1016/j.jinteco.2011.11.011
Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy?
resolves10.5089/9781475536751.001
Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01548.x
Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns
resolves10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00079-7
On the formation of industry lobby groups
resolves10.1086/261155
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
resolves10.1111/1475-679x.12112
Explaining Rules‐Based Characteristics in U.S. GAAP: Theories and Evidence
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.005
Political contribution caps and lobby formation: Theory and evidence
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00073
Clubs and the Market
resolves10.1257/aer.20141388
The Limits to Partial Banking Unions: A Political Economy Approach
resolves10.1111/1475-679X.12118
Lobbying and Uniform Disclosure Regulation
resolves10.1162/00335530152466250
Coase Versus the Coasians
resolves10.1561/0500000038
Should Banks’ Stress Test Results be Disclosed? An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2849877
Hub-and-Spoke Regulation and Bank Leverage
resolves10.5089/9781475521160.006
A Banking Union for the Euro Area
resolves10.3386/w24168
The Death of a Regulator: Strict Supervision, Bank Lending, and Business Activity
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1978724
Corporate Lobbying: A Review of the Recent Literature
resolves10.3386/w4149
Protection For Sale
resolves10.2307/2297852
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
resolves10.1086/680933
Wall Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street: Political Influence and Financial Regulation
resolves10.1086/663992
A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03966.x
Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation
resolves10.1007/s11238-007-9030-x
A recursive core for partition function form games
resolves10.1162/003355399556223
What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2017.2895
Lobbying on Regulatory Enforcement Actions: Evidence from U.S. Commercial and Savings Banks
resolves10.2307/1962770
Coalitions and Cabinet Government
resolves10.1016/s0022-1996(01)00146-5
Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation: an application to the free-rider problem
resolves10.1257/aer.89.5.1116
Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination
resolves10.1287/moor.3.4.265
Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games
resolves10.2307/j.ctvjsf522
Game Theory
resolves10.1257/aer.15000001
Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy
resolves10.1006/jeth.1996.2236
Equilibrium Binding Agreements
resolves10.1006/game.1998.0648
A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures
resolves10.1016/b978-0-444-53766-9.00005-7
Coalition Formation
resolves10.1016/0022-1996(86)90041-3
Tariffs, subsidies, and welfare with endogenous policy
resolves10.2307/3003160
The Theory of Economic Regulation
resolves10.1002/nav.3800100126
N‐person games in partition function form
resolves10.2307/1909607
The Theory of Syndicates
resolves10.1006/game.1997.0567
Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities
The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref2
no DOI — not checkedBig banks reshape lobbying game
no DOI — not checkedImproved implementation of federal reserve policies could help mitigate threats to independence
no DOI — not checkedLarge banks raise their lobbying game with trade group shakeup
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedref27
no DOI — not checkedref28
no DOI — not checkedIs there a free-rider problem in lobbying? endogenous tari�s, trigger strategies, and the number of ?rms
no DOI — not checkedOne size ?ts all? costs and bene?ts of uniform accounting standards
no DOI — not checkedref47
no DOI — not checkedref49
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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