Reference health
Disentangling Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Supply Induced Demand: An Empirical Analysis of the Demand for Healthcare Services
38/38 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-16
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
19 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 38 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1002/hec.860
Determinants of access to physician services in Italy: a latent class seemingly unrelated probit approach
resolves10.1016/j.jhealeco.2007.10.006
Are primary care physicians, public and private sector specialists substitutes or complements? Evidence from a simultaneous equations model for count data
resolves10.1002/hec.879
Access to physician services: does supplemental insurance matter? Evidence from France
resolves10.2307/2297531
A Microeconometric Model of the Demand for Health Care and Health Insurance in Australia
resolves10.1177/1536867x0600600202
Calculation of Multivariate Normal Probabilities by Simulation, with Applications to Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimation
resolves10.2307/2696362
Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey
resolves10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00015-4
Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a French natural experiment
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2706185
Insurance-Induced Moral Hazard: A Dynamic Model of Within-Year Medical Care Decision Making Under Uncertainty
resolves10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.02.007
Incentive and selection effects of Medigap insurance on inpatient care
resolves10.1007/978-1-349-63660-0_10
Supplier-Induced Demand: Some Empirical Evidence and Implications
resolves10.1086/379936
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market
resolves10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00003-8
An econometric model of health care utilization and health insurance in Switzerland
resolves10.2307/20079170
The Impact of Having Supplementary Private Health Insurance on the Use of Specialists
resolves10.1016/j.jeconom.2015.08.002
Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance
resolves10.2307/1911187
Tests for the Bivariate Normal Distribution in Econometric Models with Selectivity
resolves10.2307/2526523
The Common Structure of Tests for Selectivity Bias, Serial Correlation, Heteroscedasticity and Non-Normality in the Tobit Model
resolves10.4324/9780203337394_chapter_27
Some interim results from a controlled trial of cost sharing in health insurance
resolves10.1215/03616878-2007-061
Attrition in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment: A Response to Nyman
resolves10.2307/1885326
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
The 19 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedQualitative Models
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedPrivate Insurance in Italy: Where We Stand Now
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedEstimation and Inference in Nonlinear Structural Models
no DOI — not checkedSupplier-Induced Demand for Medical Services
no DOI — not checkedSelection and Incentive Effects: an Econometric Study of Swiss Health Insurance Claims Data
no DOI — not checkedSeparating selection and incentive effects in health insurance
no DOI — not checkedref29
no DOI — not checkedref30
no DOI — not checkedref31
no DOI — not checkedCondizioni di salute e ricorso ai servizi sanitari
no DOI — not checkedref38
no DOI — not checkedref40
no DOI — not checkedA Survey of the Literature on Selectivity Bias as it Pertains to Healthcare Markets
no DOI — not checkedHealth insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment
no DOI — not checkedref46
no DOI — not checkedConstraints on the Parameters in Simultaneous Tobit and Probit Models
no DOI — not checkedref55
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