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Reflections on the Current Fashion for Central Bank Independence
45/45 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
57 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 45 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2077833
Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence
resolves10.1080/09672560050210106
On exogenous money and bank behaviour: the Pandora's box kept shut in Keynes' theory of liquidity preference?
resolves10.3386/t0009
The Superiority of Contingent Rules over Fixed Rules in Models with Rational Expectations
resolves10.1016/s0304-3932(98)00055-5
Optimal monetary policy rules in a rational expectations model of the Phillips curve
resolves10.1515/jeeh-1992-0410
CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028653
The trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028560
ON THE ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 'INSTITUTIONAL' REMEDIES
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028649
Central bank independence--conceptual clarifications and interim assessment
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028659
Assessing central bank independence in developing countries: do actions speak louder than words?
resolves10.1016/s0176-2680(99)00036-1
The election cycle in the inflation bias: evidence from the G-7 countries
resolves10.2307/2235461
What Should Central Banks Do? What Should Be Their Macroeconomic Objectives and Operations?
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028652
Time inconsistency in a model with lags, persistence, and overlapping wage contracts
resolves10.1162/002081898550644
Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union
resolves10.1016/s0176-2680(98)00006-8
Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability
resolves10.1016/s0304-3932(99)00026-4
Does the time-consistency problem explain the behavior of inflation in the United States?
resolves10.1162/002081898550635
Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and the Real Effects of Money
resolves10.1007/bf02707673
Disinflation costs, accelerating inflation gains, and central bank independence
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028657
Measuring central bank independence: a tale of subjectivity and of its consequences
resolves10.1007/978-1-349-24002-9_21
The Monetarist Controversy, or, Should we Forsake Stabilization Policies?
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028654
Political consensus, uncertain preferences, and central bank independence
resolves10.3386/w5251
Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts
The 57 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedIndependent Central Banks: Low Inflation At No Cost?
no DOI — not checkedInflation and Reputation
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedWhat Central Bankers Could Learn from Academics--and Vice Versa
no DOI — not checkedref13
no DOI — not checkedHow Independent Should a Central Bank Be?
no DOI — not checkedAmerica's Peacetime Inflation: The 1970s
no DOI — not checkedThe Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Monetary Policy Design: Rules vs. Discretion Again
no DOI — not checkedModern Central Banks
no DOI — not checkedref30
no DOI — not checkedShould There Be An Independent Monetary Authority?
no DOI — not checkedThe Monetary Theory and Policy of Henry Simons
no DOI — not checkedTo Promote Prosperity: U.S. Domestic Policy in the 1980s
no DOI — not checkedCentral Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting: Monetary Policy Paradigms for the Next Millenium?
no DOI — not checkedref38
no DOI — not checkedGame Theory for Central Bankers: A Report to the Governor of the Bank of England
no DOI — not checkedThe Development of Central Banking
no DOI — not checkedCentral Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe
no DOI — not checkedThe ECB and its Watchers
no DOI — not checkedThe Monetary Policy of the Labour Party
no DOI — not checkedThe General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
no DOI — not checkedref54
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility Versus Flexibility
no DOI — not checkedWhy Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There is No Institutional Fix for Politics
no DOI — not checkedDeclarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence
no DOI — not checkedref65
no DOI — not checkedThe Monetary Transmission Mechanism: An Empirical Framework
no DOI — not checkedMonetary Policy Guidelines for Employment and Inflation Stability
no DOI — not checkedInflation and Unemployment
no DOI — not checkedref76
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Contracts for Independent Central Bankers
no DOI — not checkedref78
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no DOI — not checkedref81
no DOI — not checkedFriedman's favour for legislated rules is in line with earlier "Chicago plans"(cf. Friedman 1967, Laidler 1999, Simons 1936). In his view, however, price stability laws allowed the authorities far too much discretion. Interestingly, already Friedman's (1948) earliest plan featured legislated instrument rules (as opposed to instrument independence). In fact, Friedman abhorred the whole idea of manipulating interest rates and thus strongly criticized the indirect implementation approach of monetary targeting
no DOI — not checked1980) arguing that modern economies may be afflicted by a structurally caused inflationary bias which monetary policy may not be able to offset costlessly. Arguably, those downward nominal rigidities at the root of this bias should not be counteracted either as they support the system's stability and monetary policy
no DOI — not checkedref84
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no DOI — not checkedor do not , accurately take account of private expectational behaviour, but fails to illuminate how private expectations may be guided (or, anchored) on zero rather than positive inflation; a failure of which would imply a policy-induced recession. He simply assumes that "an unconstrained but independent" central bank would solve the problem. Paradoxically, McCallum's research seems otherwise
no DOI — not checkedref89
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no DOI — not checkeddistorted" natural rate level. Hence the inflationary bias rises with the absolute size of the gap between the two, which would not be the case if the targeted rate were always, say, two percentage points below the time-varying or time-invariant natural rate. In either case, the time-inconsistency caricature of discretionary policy-making postulates that the policymaker would never be inclined to stop "chasing the moon
no DOI — not checkedref92
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no DOI — not checkedoffers evidence of an "election cycle in the inflation bias" for G7 countries except the U.S., which he rationalises in terms of retrospective voters and output persistence
no DOI — not checkedref96
no DOI — not checkedThe supposed evidence consists largely of cross-country comparisons based on a variety of indices of central bank independence (Alesina and Summer 1993, Cukierman 1992, Eijffinger and de Haan 1996 etc), which are then fallaciously applied for making time-series promises of the free-lunch type. For one thing, see Magano's (1998) "tale of subjectivity" in these analyses. One key criticism is, of course, that statistical correlations do not imply causation, which may actually run the other way round or be due to third factors (Campillo and Miron
no DOI — not checkedIf the monetary structure features scope for discretion in this regard, the time-inconsistency literature might even encourage practical central bankers (particularly those with an academic background) to become obsessed with their anti-inflation reputation and the idea that acting "tough" on inflation is the best policy under all circumstances and will always be perceived as such by the markets. If financial market participants entertain models of the world other than the peculiar one postulated in the time-inconsistency literature, such obsession might not only lead to poor monetary policy. It might even provoke the very type of time-inconsistency problem in financial markets that Keynes identified; as I argue elsewhere (Bibow 2001) has been the case with the European Central Bank [ECB] over 1999-2000. According to Issing (1999), the ECB's chief economist, there "has been a very fruitful discussion
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no DOI — not checkedSvensson (1997) argues that prescribing an inflation target below the target rate society actually wishes to achieve represents the kind of efficient principal-agent-contract which would counterbalance the time-inconsistency problem. Could the peculiar bias of irrationality afflicting the time-inconsistency theme be made more apparent? In general, monetary theorists do not view setting the watch five minutes in advance to avoid coming late as particularly rational
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