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Observing and Shaping the Market: The Dilemma of Central Banks

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2803210
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27/27 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

9 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 27 checked references that resolve
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Optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge
resolves10.1086/657923
Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2012.02.001
Learning from private and public observations of othersʼ actions
resolves10.1007/s00199-004-0587-0
Imperfect common knowledge and the information value of prices
resolves10.1257/aer.20110865
Real Rigidity, Nominal Rigidity, and the Social Value of Information
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00783.x
Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information
resolves10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.06.001
The signaling role of policy actions
resolves10.1111/jeea.12077
REDUCING OVERREACTION TO CENTRAL BANKS' DISCLOSURES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT
resolves10.1111/jofi.12303
Government Intervention and Information Aggregation by Prices
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhp059
Market-Based Corrective Actions
resolves10.1007/s001990050006
Social learning and costly information acquisition
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02139.x
Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination
resolves10.2307/1912324
A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information
resolves10.1111/1468-2354.00114
Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy With Unobservable Goals
resolves10.1111/1468-0297.00082
Central Bank Transparency
resolves10.1093/restud/rdq017
Learning and Complementarities in Speculative Attacks
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511817410.007
The use of knowledge in society
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00515.x
Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
resolves10.1257/aer.101.4.1561
Optimal Policy Intervention and the Social Value of Public Information
resolves10.1257/000282802762024610
Social Value of Public Information
resolves10.1353/eca.2006.0008
Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices
resolves10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.01.003
Central bank communication design in a Lucas-Phelps economy
resolves10.1093/restud/rdr018
Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
resolves10.1093/restud/rdt024
Exogenous Information, Endogenous Information, and Optimal Monetary Policy
resolves10.1257/000282806776157650
Social Value of Public Information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2697659
Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games
resolves10.3386/w11898
Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness
The 9 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref7
no DOI — not checkedEndogenous central bank information and the optimal degree of transparency
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedHow do central banks talk?
no DOI — not checkedref18
no DOI — not checkedOn the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedref28
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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