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Data-Driven Incentive Design in the Medicare Shared Savings Program
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The 81 checked references that resolve
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When Not All Conflict Is Bad: Manufacturing-Marketing Conflict and Strategic Incentive Design
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Store Manager Incentive Design and Retail Performance: An Exploratory Investigation
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A Simulation Shows Limited Savings From Meeting Quality Targets Under The Medicare Shared Savings Program
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A Framework For Evaluating The Formation, Implementation, And Performance Of Accountable Care Organizations
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Impact of Performance-Based Contracting on Product Reliability: An Empirical Analysis
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The Effect of Delayed Incentives on Supply Chain Profits and Consumer Surplus
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An Evidence-Based Incentive System for Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Program
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On the Effectiveness of Uniform Subsidies in Increasing Market Consumption
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Building Regulatory And Operational Flexibility Into Accountable Care Organizations And ‘Shared Savings’
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Performance Differences in Year 1 of Pioneer Accountable Care Organizations
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Changes in Health Care Spending and Quality for Medicare Beneficiaries Associated With a Commercial ACO Contract
resolves10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295211.003.0003
Notes on Welfare Economics, Information, and Uncertainty
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Relative Performance of Incentive Mechanisms: Computational Modeling and Simulation of Delegated Investment Decisions
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Modeling the Impact of an Outcome-Oriented Reimbursement Policy on Clinic, Patients, and Pharmaceutical Firms
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Threshold incentives over multiple periods and the sales hockey stick phenomenon
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Subsidizing the Distribution Channel: Donor Funding to Improve the Availability of Malaria Drugs
resolves10.1377/hlthaff.2013.1086
Developing A Viable Alternative To Medicare’s Physician Payment Strategy
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2015.2280
Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program: An Economic and Operational Analysis
resolves10.1007/s10729-016-9377-z
Modeling and designing health care payment innovations for medical imaging
resolves10.1007/bf00157790
Organizational Conference Announcement U.S. and Canadian Healthcare Ethics Committees October 1, 1991, 1:00?5:00 pm Boston Park Plaza Hotel, Boston, Massachusetts
resolves10.1111/j.1528-1167.2009.02377_10.x
Monday, December 7, 2009
Poster Session 3
8:00 a.m.‐6:00 p.m.
The 29 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedMedicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations. Final rule
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no DOI — not checkedNational Association of ACOs
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no DOI — not checkedThe ACO rules-striking the balance between participation and transformative potential
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no DOI — not checked$382) $316 ($216, $423) $34 ($22, $49) <0.01 ?-Based Medicare $146 ($39, $260) $207 ($97, $328) $62 ($48
no DOI — not checked$642) $523 ($320, $741) $96 ($78
no DOI — not checked$375) $332 ($232, $437) $54 ($40, $73) <0.01 �-Based Medicare $127
no DOI — not checked$602) $519 ($308, $734) $124 ($99
no DOI — not checkedHowever, since the existing MSSP benchmarking mechanism lowers the benchmark based on the ACO's savings in the previous year, an ACO might find it optimal to strategically curtail investment (and generate lower savings) in earlier years, in order to receive more favorable benchmarks in later years. In this section, we address the multiple-period setting where the ACO may behave in this strategic manner. We briefly discuss relevant literature and potential approaches to modifying the benchmarking methodology to mitigate the investment distortions that might arise from such strategic behavior. We also present a result that shows that for a forward looking ACO, the deviation in savings from the myopic strategy vanishes over time under the existing benchmarking mechanism. The notion that an agent might find it optimal to strategically delay effort in multi-period incentive problems is well documented in the operations literature. Chen (2000) consider a salesforce compensation contract where agents receive payments based on an annual sales quota system
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