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Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.283114
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1 of 17 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-27

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.1007/bf01426213
The 16 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/1061555
The Logit Equilibrium: A Perspective on Intuitive Behavioral Anomalies
resolves10.2307/2118364
A Simple Model of Herd Behavior
resolves10.1086/261849
A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades
resolves10.1257/jep.12.3.151
Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00239
Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study
resolves10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00145-3
A model of noisy introspection
resolves10.1016/s0167-4870(00)00025-8
Informational cascades in the laboratory: Do they occur for the right reasons?
resolves10.1257/aer.91.5.1508
Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2004.06.026
Information aggregation with costly information and random ordering: Experimental evidence
resolves10.1006/game.1995.1023
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
resolves10.1111/1468-0297.00091
Information Aggregation with Random Ordering: Cascades and Overconfidence
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00158
Risk Aversion and Expected-utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem
resolves10.1006/game.1996.0087
Abreu–Matsushima Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence
resolves10.1016/0167-2681(94)90103-1
Experimental evidence on players' models of other players
resolves10.1006/game.1995.1031
On Players′ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence
resolves10.2139/ssrn.277669
Ignoring the Rationality of Others: Evidence from Experimental Normal-Form Games
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedInformation cascades in the laboratory
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedref9
no DOI — not checkedIterated dominance and iterated best response in experimental 'p-beauty contests
no DOI — not checkedUnravelling in guessing games: An experimental study
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-27 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

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