Reference health

Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2900329
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54/54 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-22

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

14 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 54 checked references that resolve
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The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984–2003
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Geopolitics, Aid, and Growth: The Impact of UN Security Council Membership on the Effectiveness of Aid
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Aid on Demand: African Leaders and the Geography of China's Foreign Assistance
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Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs
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Dancing to the Donors' Tune? Policy Choice in Aid‐Dependent Countries
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The 14 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedResistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty
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no DOI — not checkedConditionality: Under What Conditions?
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no DOI — not checkedVoting on the budget deficit
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