Reference health

Credit Ratings and Market Information

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2948890
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44/44 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

11 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 44 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhv006
Rumor Has It: Sensationalism in Financial Media
resolves10.1111/jofi.12070
Structural Shifts in Credit Rating Standards
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhy031
The Relevance of Credit Ratings in Transparent Bond Markets
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.06.001
Reputations and credit ratings: Evidence from commercial mortgage-backed securities
resolves10.1111/jofi.12153
Have Rating Agencies Become More Conservative? Implications for Capital Structure and Debt Pricing
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhp115
Which Firms Follow the Market? An Analysis of Corporate Investment Decisions
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.06.001
The Volcker Rule and corporate bond market making in times of stress
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.11.004
Ratings quality over the business cycle
resolves10.2308/accr-52000
Leveling the Playing Field between Large and Small Institutions: Evidence from the SEC's XBRL Mandate
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.012
How did increased competition affect credit ratings?
resolves10.1146/annurev-financial-110311-101826
The Real Effects of Financial Markets
resolves10.1111/jofi.12303
Government Intervention and Information Aggregation by Prices
resolves10.2308/accr-52044
Are Credit Ratings More Rigorous for Widely Covered Firms?
resolves10.1093/rof/rfy033
Do Credit Default Swaps Mitigate the Impact of Credit Rating Downgrades?
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhl024
Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.06.002
The impact of innovation: Evidence from corporate bond exchange-traded funds (ETFs)
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02364.x
Optimal Release of Information By Firms
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x
Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.10.012
Impact of the Dodd-Frank act on credit ratings
resolves10.1017/S0022109016000235
Does Information-Processing Cost Affect Firm-Specific Information Acquisition? Evidence from XBRL Adoption
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhh002
Public Trading and Private Incentives:
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.007
Board structure and price informativeness☆
resolves10.1093/rfs/hht072
The Economics of Solicited and Unsolicited Credit Ratings
resolves10.1111/1475-679X.12019
Informational Feedback, Adverse Selection, and Optimal Disclosure Policy
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhz100
Informing the Market: The Effect of Modern Information Technologies on Information Production
resolves10.1086/499414
Media Bias and Reputation
resolves10.1111/jofi.12961
Credit Rating Inflation and Firms' Investments
resolves10.1146/annurev-financial-110716-032355
Information Disclosure in Financial Markets
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.08.004
Good disclosure, bad disclosure
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.012
Public information and uninformed trading: Implications for market liquidity and price efficiency
resolves10.1086/261893
Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhy088
Is Silence Golden? Real Effects of Mandatory Disclosure
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.03.007
Large shareholders and credit ratings
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00866.x
Credit Ratings and Capital Structure
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhq077
Do Regulations Based on Credit Ratings Affect a Firm's Cost of Capital?
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(91)90033-G
Market reaction to anticipated announcements
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhv127
Who Should Pay for Credit Ratings and How?
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8
Reputation and imperfect information
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2019.3440
Do Bond Issuers Shop for Favorable Credit Ratings?
resolves10.2307/1913210
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
resolves10.1111/j.1538-4616.2010.00341.x
Moody's and S&P Ratings: Are They Equivalent? Conservative Ratings and Split Rated Bond Yields
resolves10.1016/j.jmoneco.2009.04.004
Rating the raters: Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-X
Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.09.002
Honest certification and the threat of capture
The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedThe Cost of Immediacy for Corporate Bonds
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedA Theory of Financial Media
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedref36
no DOI — not checkedPartisan Professionals: Evidence from Credit Rating Analysts
no DOI — not checkedref49
no DOI — not checkedref50
no DOI — not checkedref54
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