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It's Easier to Contract Than to Pay: Judicial Independence and U.S. Municipal Default in the 19th Century

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2962074
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39/39 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

16 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 39 checked references that resolve
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Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task
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Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks
resolves10.1162/rest_a_00296
Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal Sentencing
resolves10.1086/505052
The Effect of Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence from the American States
resolves10.1920/wp.ifs.2003.0311
Judicial accountability and economic policy outcomes: evidence from employment discrimination charges
resolves10.1017/s0020818312000185
Finding the “Democratic Advantage” in Sovereign Bond Ratings: The Importance of Strong Courts, Property Rights Protection, and the Rule of Law
resolves10.2307/2235494
Dynamic Count Data Models of Technological Innovation
resolves10.1017/CBO9781139013567
Regression Analysis of Count Data
resolves10.1017/CBO9781139174183
Forging Industrial Policy
resolves10.1017/s1744137413000234
Financial markets, fiscal constraints, and municipal debt: lessons and evidence from the panic of 1873
resolves10.1007/s10101-015-0172-y
Do fiscal constraints prevent default? Historical evidence from U.S. municipalities
resolves10.1016/s0176-2680(03)00017-x
Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators
resolves10.2307/3114090
The Federal Courts, Localism, and the National Economy, 1865–1900
resolves10.1177/009614428200800302
Dillon's Rule and the Cooley Doctrine
resolves10.2139/ssrn.441820
Direct Democracy and Debt
resolves10.7312/good91334
Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads 1800-1890
resolves10.1023/A:1016563902580
Bailouts in a Federation
resolves10.1561/100.00006035
The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior
resolves10.1093/jleo/ewv007
Trial and Error: Decision Reversal and Panel Size in State Courts
resolves10.1093/jleo/16.2.534
Independent courts and administrative agencies: an empirical analysis of the states
resolves10.1086/421572
Learning about Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the State Courts
resolves10.1016/j.irle.2007.07.004
Explaining de facto judicial independence
resolves10.2307/845381
Establishing the Basis for Local Financing of American Railroad Construction in the Nineteenth Century: From City of Bridgeport v. The Housatonic Railroad Company to Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque
resolves10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00068.x
Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for Office?
resolves10.1093/aler/ahi005
The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth Century England
resolves10.1111/ecoj.12389
The Financial Power of the Powerless: Socio‐Economic Status and Interest Rates Under Partial Rule of Law
resolves10.1086/381480
Judicial Checks and Balances
resolves10.1596/9780821397664_ch14
Caveat Creditor: State Systems of Local Government Borrowing in the United States
resolves10.1257/0002828042002606
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511808678
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
resolves10.1017/s0022050700009451
Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England
resolves10.1007/s10797-005-1619-9
Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism
resolves10.2307/3310711
State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic Approach
resolves10.2307/2111172
A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis
resolves10.3386/w6237
State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S. Municipal Bond Market
resolves10.2139/ssrn.149988
Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint
resolves10.1177/109114219802600202
Do Tax and Expenditure Limitations Affect Local Government Budgets? Evidence From Panel Data
resolves10.4159/harvard.9780674062825
The People's Courts
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511511462.019
Dysfunctional or Optimal Institutions? State Debt Limitations, the Structure of State and Local Governments, and the Finance of American Infrastructure
The 16 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedTerm Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedInterregional Differences in Per Capita Income, Population, and Total Income
no DOI — not checkedref17
no DOI — not checkedref27
no DOI — not checkedref30
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no DOI — not checkedref48
no DOI — not checkedref49
no DOI — not checkedEconomic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review
no DOI — not checkedThe Effect of Judicial Selection Processes on Judicial Constitutional Change, 1842 to 1852
no DOI — not checkedref55
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