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Do the Right Thing: Preferences for Moral Behavior, Rather Than Equity or Efficiency per se, Drive Human Prosociality

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2965067
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1 of 44 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-02

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

6 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

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The 43 checked references that resolve
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resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.002
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The 6 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref4
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedref14
no DOI — not checkedIdentifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary
no DOI — not checkedCooperation, fast and slow: Meta-analytic evidence for a theory of social heuristics and self-interested deliberation
no DOI — not checkedSinning Saints and Saintly Sinners:The Paradox of Moral Self-Regulation
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