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Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Auction Design: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage
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The 64 checked references that resolve
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The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences
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Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms
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Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedThe competition complexity of auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer result for multidimensional bidders
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