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The Swing Voter's Curse in Proportional Representation Systems (Evidence from Multiple Elections)

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3010088
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no DOI — not checkedLikelihood of voting: 1=certain not to vote 5=certain to vote. Normalized to takes values between 0 (surely not) and 1 (for sure). Chances of party j entering parliament: 0=no chances 3=for sure. Normalized to take values between 0 and 21 All support and sympathy variables take values between 1 and 10 for Israel. 100. Used to construct 'Difference in chances to enter parliament between preferred party and most likely party to enter parliament' which takes values from -100 to 0. Other controls: education (1=primary, 7=university or higher)
no DOI — not checkedNormalized to takes values between 0 and 1. Other controls: education (1=did not finish any, 13=PhD)
no DOI — not checkedNormalized to takes values between 0 and 1. Chances of party j entering parliament: 0=very unlikely 3=very likely. Normalized to take values between 0 and 100. Used to construct 'Difference in chances to enter parliament between preferred party and most likely party to enter parliament' which takes values from -100 to 0. Other controls: education (1=no certificate, 5=higher qualification)
no DOI — not checkedI have already sent off my postal vote"). Normalized to takes values between 0 and 1. Chances of party j entering parliament: 0=very unlikely 4=very likely. Normalized to take values between 0 and 100. Used to construct 'Difference in chances to enter parliament between preferred party and most likely party to enter parliament' which takes values from -100 to 0
no DOI — not checkedNormalized to takes values between 0 and 1. Other controls: education (in years of schooling)
no DOI — not checkedChances most likely = Chances 2nd most likely'). 'Difference in Support': 'Support for most preferred among the most likely coalitions' -'Support for second most preferred among the most likely coalitions'. Estimation: partially linear estimation using Robinson's (1988) double residual semiparametric regression estimator (halfbandwidth=1). The shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals. See expression (3) for the exact regression specification
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