Reference health
Does the Policy Lending of the Government Financial Institution Mitigate the Credit Crunch? Evidence from the Loan Level Data in Japan
36/36 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
6 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 36 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1057/jibs.2011.17
Foreign direct investment and regulatory remedies for banking crises: Lessons from Japan
resolves10.1111/jmcb.12086
Does Macro‐Prudential Regulation Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.012
Bank ownership and credit over the business cycle: Is lending by state banks less procyclical?
resolves10.1016/s1573-4412(07)06065-5
Chapter 65 Microeconometric Models of Investment and Employment
resolves10.1016/j.jimonfin.2015.02.017
The after crisis government-driven credit expansion in Brazil: A firm level analysis
resolves10.1111/jofi.12130
The Real Effects of Government‐Owned Banks: Evidence from an Emerging Market
resolves10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.11.001
Bank ownership, lending, and local economic performance during the 2008–2009 financial crisis
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.08.017
Bank ownership and lending patterns during the 2008–2009 financial crisis: Evidence from Latin America and Eastern Europe
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2516517
Credit Constraints and Business Performance: Evidence from Public Lending in Colombia
resolves10.1016/j.jfs.2016.07.017
The effects of public capital infusions on banks’ risk-shifting to the deposit insurance system in Japan
resolves10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00040-5
The “credit crunch” and the availability of credit to small business
resolves10.1016/j.jjie.2015.12.001
A panel study of zombie SMEs in Japan: Identification, borrowing and investment behavior
resolves10.1162/003355305775097524
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
resolves10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.08.016
What Do State-Owned Development Banks Do? Evidence from BNDES, 2002–09
resolves10.2139/ssrn.414980
Financial Distress and Corporate Investment: The Japanese Case in the 90s
resolves10.1257/0002828054825691
Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan
resolves10.1111/jofi.12585
Government Credit, a Double‐Edged Sword: Evidence from the China Development Bank
resolves10.2307/2556100
An Adverse-Selection Model of Bank Asset and Liability Management with Implications for the Transmission of Monetary Policy
resolves10.1016/j.jjie.2010.08.001
The Effectiveness of Public Credit Guarantees in the Japanese Loan Market
resolves10.1111/j.0022-2879.2007.00039.x
Prudential Regulation and the “Credit Crunch”: Evidence from Japan
resolves10.1353/mcb.2003.0050
In Search of "Capital Crunch": Supply Factors Behind the Credit Slowdown in Japan
The 6 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedDo Publicly Owned Banks Lend Against the Wind?
no DOI — not checkedref32
no DOI — not checkedForbearance Lending: The Case of Japanese Firms
no DOI — not checkedA Not-for-publication Appendix to Include Robustness Checks to "Prudential Regulation and the "Credit Crunch': Evidence from Japan
no DOI — not checkedThe fiscal year (FY) begins on April 1st and ends on March 31st of the next year. The reported results for each fiscal year are based on the regression equations with a firm's ROA (column 1) or its EBITDA to total assets ratio (column 2) as a dependent variable and the logarithm of exante total assets and the ex-ante ROA as additional independent variables. The presented coefficients are those of the logarithm of JASME total loans. Instrumental variables are independent variables used in the regressions whose results are reported in Table 2, CAPSUR and three financial statement based variables, the logarithm of total assets, ROA and leverage, which are measured as of the fiscal year closing for a firm between
no DOI — not checkedThe fiscal year (FY) begins on April 1st and ends on March 31st of the next year. The presented coefficients are those of the logarithm of JASME total loans. For the regressions whose results are reported in column 1, additional independent variables are the marginal q, the cash flow to capital stock ratio and CASUR. Among them, the marginal q and the cash flow to capital stock ratio are considered endogenous. For the regressions whose results are reported in column 2, additional independent variables are the (initial) employment in FY 1998. Instrumental variables (IVs) for the regressions whose results are reported in columns 2 are three financial statement based variables, the logarithm of total assets, ROA and leverage, which are measured as of the fiscal year closing for a firm between
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this
work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
checked 2026-08-27 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
Embed this badge
Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.
<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3018373"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3018373/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3018373)