Reference health
An Invitation to Market Design
1 of 185 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-09-22
At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.
36 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2312726
The 184 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1257/aer.91.5.1369
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation
resolves10.1016/j.enpol.2007.10.029
Price drivers and structural breaks in European carbon prices 2005–2007
resolves10.1038/nature08019
Warming caused by cumulative carbon emissions towards the trillionth tonne
resolves10.2139/ssrn.3071751
College Admission with Multidimensional Privileges: The Brazilian Affirmative Action Case
resolves10.1257/aer.p20171049
Large-Scale Affirmative Action in School Choice: Admissions to IITs in India
resolves10.1145/2492002.2482579
Existence of stable matchings in large markets with complementarities
resolves10.1016/j.finmar.2004.11.001
Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations, empirical results, and policy implications
resolves10.1007/s10683-013-9350-3
Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs
resolves10.1111/1468-0297.00020
The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences
resolves10.1086/664613
The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
resolves10.1287/opre.2016.1544
Course Match: A Large-Scale Implementation of Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Combinatorial Allocation
resolves10.1257/aer.102.5.2237
The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard
resolves10.1093/qje/qjv027
The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response *
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2890666
Matching and Pricing in Ride Hailing: Wild Goose Chases and How to Solve Them
resolves10.3386/w21778
Big Data and Big Cities: The Promises and Limitations of Improved Measures of Urban Life
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.013
Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.003
Pareto improvements from Lexus Lanes: The effects of pricing a portion of the lanes on congested highways
resolves10.3386/w22843
An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States
resolves10.1093/jrs/fex022
The Local Refugee Match: Aligning Refugees’ Preferences with the Capacities and Priorities of Localities
resolves10.1257/mic.2.3.160
Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.006
Ascending prices and package bidding: Further experimental analysis
resolves10.1162/003355300554719
The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
resolves10.1257/aer.102.3.366
Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Match and Its Solution
resolves10.1257/aer.20101552
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications
resolves10.3386/w20344
Can Electronic Procurement Improve Infrastructure Provision? Evidence From Public Works in India and Indonesia
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1917709
An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?
resolves10.2307/1907539
On Equilibrium in Graham's Model of World Trade and Other Competitive Systems
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.003
Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2029263
Where's the Innovation? An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents
resolves10.1111/j.1755-263x.2012.00309.x
Payments for ecosystem services and the fatal attraction of win‐win solutions
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1212202
Electronic BushBroker Exchange: Designing a Combinatorial Double Auction for Native Vegetation Offsets
resolves10.1086/378530
Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1110.1496
Combinatorial Auctions for Procurement: An Empirical Study of the Chilean School Meals Auction
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.011
Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evidence from the residency match
resolves10.1111/j.1523-1739.2008.00963.x
Evaluation of a Market in Wetland Credits: Entrepreneurial Wetland Banking in Chicago
resolves10.1086/261272
The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00335
The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
resolves10.1007/s00182-008-0117-6
Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
resolves10.1257/aer.89.4.748
The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
resolves10.1257/aer.97.3.828
Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
resolves10.1086/262074
Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists
resolves10.2139/ssrn.3073027
Making it Safe to Use Centralized Marketplaces: Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design
resolves10.1080/01441640500064439
Urban Congestion Charging: A Comparison between London and Singapore
resolves10.1287/isre.1090.0267
An Experimental Comparison of Linear and Nonlinear Price Combinatorial Auctions
resolves10.1093/oxrep/grx040
The design of environmental markets: What have we learned from experience with cap and trade?
resolves10.1093/oseo/instance.00043218
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
resolves10.3982/ecta10570
Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
resolves10.1093/oxrep/grx048
Market design for living-donor organ exchanges: an economic policy perspective
resolves10.1111/j.1467-8489.2003.t01-1-00224.x
Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial
resolves10.2307/1992001
Monetary Theory and the Great Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-op Crisis: Comment
resolves10.1016/j.marpol.2012.05.039
Fisheries quota allocation: Laboratory experiments on simultaneous and combinatorial auctions
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
resolves10.1509/jmr.15.0204
The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry
The 36 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedHow often do patent assertion entities win patent suits?
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedMissing "one-offs" in high school choice in New York City
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedref38
no DOI — not checkedref45
no DOI — not checkedref48
no DOI — not checkedref55
no DOI — not checkedref56
no DOI — not checkedMarket design in developing-world cities
no DOI — not checkedIs there a patent troll problem in the UK?
no DOI — not checkedref80
no DOI — not checkedCash for carbon: A randomized trial of payments for ecosystem services to reduce deforestation
no DOI — not checkedThe General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money
no DOI — not checkedOf fire ants and claim construction: An empirical study of the meteoric rise of the eastern district of Texas as a preeminent forum for patent litigation
no DOI — not checkedref121
no DOI — not checkedref137
no DOI — not checkedref148
no DOI — not checkedref149
no DOI — not checkedref150
no DOI — not checkedAchieving Budget-Balance with VickreyBased Payment Schemes in Exchanges
no DOI — not checkedref154
no DOI — not checkedref157
no DOI — not checkedref161
no DOI — not checkedA natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom
no DOI — not checkedref178
no DOI — not checkedJumping the gun: Imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions
no DOI — not checkedMarket design under weak institutions
no DOI — not checkedref189
no DOI — not checkedref195
no DOI — not checkedref199
no DOI — not checkedref211
no DOI — not checkedref212
no DOI — not checkedref213
no DOI — not checkedCongestion theory and transport investment
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