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How Internal Constraints Shape Interest Group Activities: Evidence from Access-Seeking PACs

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3062836
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52/52 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

25 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 52 checked references that resolve
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no DOI — not checkedWalmart's Plan to Encourage Political Donations Violate Election Law, Groups Claim
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no DOI — not checkedGoogle Broadens Its Outreach to GOP
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no DOI — not checkedREGHDFE: Stata Module To Perform Linear or Instrumentalvariable Regression Absorbing Any Number of High-dimensional Fixed Effects
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no DOI — not checkedPoll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court's Decision on Campaign Financing
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no DOI — not checkedInterest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees
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no DOI — not checkedRisky Business: Does Corporate Political Giving Affect Consumer Behavior
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