Reference health

When do we punish people who don't?

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3080990
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6 of 73 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-06

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

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does not resolve to a known work10.1016/S1090-5138
does not resolve to a known work10.1016/S1090-5138(02
does not resolve to a known work10.1073/pnas.1315273111/-
does not resolve to a known work10.1111/evo.12637.This
does not resolve to a known work10.1016/j.celrep.2011.1011.1001.7
The 67 checked references that resolve
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Human punishment is motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality
resolves10.1038/srep06025
Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game
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The Neural Correlates of Third-Party Punishment
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On Justifying Punishment: The Discrepancy Between Words and Actions
resolves10.1037/0022-3514.83.2.284
Why do we punish? Deterrence and just deserts as motives for punishment.
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Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?
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Punishment in Humans: From Intuitions to Institutions
resolves10.1371/journal.pone.0006699
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Incapacitation and just deserts as motives for punishment.
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The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment
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resolves10.1556/jep.11.2013.1.3
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Social norms and human cooperation
resolves10.1007/s12110-002-1012-7
Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms
resolves10.1038/415137a
Altruistic punishment in humans
resolves10.1038/ncomms6306
Fairness violations elicit greater punishment on behalf of another than for oneself
resolves10.1073/pnas.0500938102
Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.016
Punishment can support cooperation even when punishable
resolves10.1126/science.1164744
The Long-Run Benefits of Punishment
resolves10.1016/s1090-5138(02)00157-5
Explaining altruistic behavior in humans
resolves10.1371/journal.pone.0110045
Both Loved and Feared: Third Party Punishers Are Viewed as Formidable and Likeable, but These Reputational Benefits May Only Be Open to Dominant Individuals
resolves10.1016/j.cognition.2014.06.001
Outcomes and intentions in children’s, adolescents’, and adults’ second- and third-party punishment behavior
resolves10.18637/jss.v059.i09
A Kenward-Roger Approximation and Parametric Bootstrap Methods for Tests in Linear Mixed Models - The<i>R</i>Package<b>pbkrtest</b>
resolves10.1126/science.1126398
Cooperation, Punishment, and the Evolution of Human Institutions
resolves10.1126/science.1182238
Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment
resolves10.1126/science.1127333
Costly Punishment Across Human Societies
resolves10.1126/science.1153808
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
resolves10.1073/pnas.1315273111
Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment
resolves10.5178/lebs.2010.2
Punishers May Be Chosen as Providers But Not as Recipients
resolves10.1038/nature16981
Third-party punishment as a costly signal of trustworthiness
resolves10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.04.004
Third-party punishment as a costly signal of high continuation probabilities in repeated games
resolves10.1037/a0011381
Cooperation in social dilemmas: Free riding may be thwarted by second-order reward rather than by punishment.
resolves10.1371/journal.pone.0045662
What Are Punishment and Reputation for?
resolves10.1177/0956797615624469
Looking Under the Hood of Third-Party Punishment Reveals Design for Personal Benefit
resolves10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.06.001
Audience effects on moralistic punishment
resolves10.18637/jss.v082.i13
<b>lmerTest</b> Package: Tests in Linear Mixed Effects Models
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2012.09.018
An exploration of third and second party punishment in ten simple games
resolves10.1371/journal.pone.0125193
To Punish or to Leave: Distinct Cognitive Processes Underlie Partner Control and Partner Choice Behaviors
resolves10.1002/9781118661666.ch12
The Adaptive Logic of Moral Luck
resolves10.1016/j.cognition.2015.11.008
Why we forgive what can’t be controlled
resolves10.1257/000282803321455359
Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
resolves10.1073/pnas.1105604108
Punishment sustains large-scale cooperation in prestate warfare
resolves10.1017/S0140525X11002160
Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness
resolves10.1177/1948550614527115
For Members Only
resolves10.1073/pnas.1704032114
Evolution of flexibility and rigidity in retaliatory punishment
resolves10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001
The price you pay: cost-dependent reputation effects of altruistic punishment
resolves10.2307/1964229
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
resolves10.31234/osf.io/c3bsj
Reputational and cooperative benefits of third-party compensation
resolves10.1016/j.tree.2014.12.003
The reputation of punishers
resolves10.1111/evo.12637
Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so
resolves10.1016/j.tree.2011.12.004
Punishment and cooperation in nature
resolves10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199300730.003.0004
Regulating the Regulation
resolves10.1038/nn.3781
Corticolimbic gating of emotion-driven punishment
resolves10.1086/406755
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
resolves10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.03.006
How, when, and why recipients and observers reward good deeds and punish bad deeds
resolves10.1080/13504851.2016.1161709
Second-party and third-party punishment in a public goods experiment
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedref45
no DOI — not checkedTurning a Blind Eye
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