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Formal Insurance, Risk Sharing, and the Dynamics of Other-Regarding Preferences

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3100388
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

8 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 55 checked references that resolve
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The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedPobreza a Nivel Municipio
no DOI — not checkedVulnerability, risk management, and agricultural development
no DOI — not checkedInsurance versus savings for the poor: Why one should offer either both or none
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