Reference health

Strategic Delegation in Procurement

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3118107
CiteStamped reference-health badge
23/23 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-21

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 23 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1287/mnsc.44.4.451
Strategic Transfer Pricing
resolves10.2308/accr.2007.82.3.551
Interacting Supply Chain Distortions: The Pricing of Internal Transfers and External Procurement
resolves10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00192.x
<scp>Pricing Internal Trade to Get a Leg up on External Rivals</scp>
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1080.0906
Friction in Related-Party Trade When a Rival Is Also a Customer
resolves10.2308/accr.2004.79.3.591
Integrating Managerial and Tax Objectives in Transfer Pricing
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679x.2006.00191.x
External and Internal Pricing in Multidivisional Firms
resolves10.1016/s0020-7063(96)90012-6
An analysis (meta- and otherwise) of multinational transfer pricing research
resolves10.1016/j.labeco.2013.08.001
Labor union bargaining and firm organizational structure
resolves10.1257/mic.2.4.77
Organizing for Synergies
resolves10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00289.x
Strategic Incentives for Keeping One Set of Books in International Transfer Pricing
resolves10.1787/888933948319
Figure 33. Italy’s tax authority spends less on IT systems than other countries’ agencies
resolves10.1515/1935-1704.1919
Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
resolves10.1007/s10058-015-0174-9
Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
resolves10.1177/0149206311424317
Strategic Delegation
resolves10.2307/2696414
Strategic Delegation: An Experiment
resolves10.2307/2527214
Unobserved Delegation
resolves10.1257/aer.100.4.1826
Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship
resolves10.1086/294110
On the Economics of Transfer Pricing
resolves10.2307/2601049
Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2613276
Managing Relational Contracts
resolves10.2307/2296698
Prices vs. Quantities
resolves10.2307/136493
Labour-Management Bargaining and Transfer Pricing in Multinational Corporations
resolves10.1016/s0022-1996(01)00090-3
Unionization, vertical markets, and the outsourcing of multinationals
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedref18
no DOI — not checkedref22
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedref26
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-21 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

Embed this badge

Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.

<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3118107"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3118107/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[![CiteStamped reference-health badge](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3118107/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3118107)